thither all the horrors of counter-revolution. In the Caucasus the treaty deprived Russia of Kars, Ardagan and Batum. and the non-recognition of the treaty because of this change by the anti-Soviet pseudo-government of Tiflis gave the Turkish army an opportunty for a further advance in Caucasia, resulting in its gradual conquest, partly by Germany and partly by Turkey, under cover of fictitious republics. The Brest treaty contained no provision binding Germany to respect the integrity and inviolability of the territory left to Soviet Russia after all the slashings and occupations, and the treaty therefore could serve as a basis for a policy of gradual encroachment and infiltration by Germany into the depths of Russia, particularly to the east, in which direction Germany aimed to occupy strategical points to meet the eventual advance of the Entente from Siberia, and in Caucasia, through which new roads appeared to open for the Asiatic plans of German imperialism. This policy of masked encroachment, based on the vagueness of the Brest treaty, enabled Germany to threaten continually during the following half year the Soviet regime and the very existence of the Soviet Republic. The complete indefiniteness of the frontiers of Ukraine, which by the treaty became a mere mask for the German military machine, gave Germany the opportunity to continue from this direction its advance towards Moscow. Before the question of the Ukrainian frontiers was definitely settled a similar vagueness and indefiniteness in the financial and economic provisions of the Brest supplementary treaties opened for Germany the possibility of the most extensive exploitation of Russia. The principle of indemnities was renounced by the treaty, but supplementary agreements were to be concluded between Russia and Germany covering reparation for the losses entailed in the care of war prisoners as well as for all the damages caused in the military zone by other than military actions, and also covering the restoration of the property rights of the nationals of both countries, thereby enabling Ger-
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