through the bodily frame. Thus the spirit of man is perceived to be within the material body.
But to descend, now, to the lower animals. They also have a kind of soul or spiritual principle, though not, indeed, like man's, immortal. For they possess instinct, and a certain kind of perception, though limited in its range; they have feelings of pain and pleasure; they are affected with attachment and aversion, and anger, and other passions. Now these are attributes of spirit; for they certainly do not belong to mere matter, which is a thing of itself entirely unconscious and inanimate. Here, then, we have a second portion of a spiritual world, present within the material.
But still further, and descending still lower, there is what is termed the "vegetative soul"—that principle which gives life to all the vegetable creation. This is indeed neither an immortal nor a conscious principle, yet it is certainly a living one, and therefore must belong to the world of spirit, taking the term in its most extensive sense. For observe, there are but two kinds of created existence, spirit and matter: all things must belong either to the one or the other. Now, life is not properly an attribute of matter: if it were, then, wherever there were matter, there would also be life. But this is not the case. We may see dead trees standing side by side with living ones, of the same genus and species: thus showing clearly that it is not to matter itself, or any particular form or arrangement of the particles of matter, that life belongs, but to something distinct from either. In the one case the "vegetative soul" is present, in the other it is absent: therefore the one tree is living, and the other dead. Since, therefore, the living principle does not belong to mat-
