nature, because that nature is itself the impelling power. If, then, this second point be made out, namely, that the prevention of evil would imply a contradiction, then the Creator cannot be charged with either a want of wisdom or of power, for not doing that which in the nature of things was impossible.
What then, it will be asked, is the contradiction that would have been involved in the absolute prevention of evil by the Divine Being? The argument, in brief, may be thus stated. Evil in its essence, is simply the perversion of the proper order of man's mind. Now, the power to pervert his own mind is necessarily inherent in man, as a being possessed of rationality and moral liberty. Then, it follows, that absolutely to prevent man's perverting his mind (or, in other words, to prevent evil) would imply the destruction of man's rationality and liberty, which would be to destroy his humanity,—since these two faculties are the characteristics of man, and distinguish him from the brutes, which, not having those faculties, cannot pervert the order of their nature. But, to destroy man's reason and moral liberty,—would be contrary both to God'a goodness and wisdom, for from that goodness and wisdom He endowed man with these faculties, as the means of his highest happiness. Now, to do what is contrary to His own goodness and wisdom, would be to act in opposition to Himself, for wisdom and goodness constitute God's very nature. And, to act in opposition to Himself involves a contradiction.
The argument is presented in this brief form, in order that the scope of it may be taken in at a glance. To render it satisfactory, however, will require explan-
