memory, sees the ideas whieh have been derived from those knowledges, and examines and compares them, and forms consequent deductions and conclusions. He is able, moreover, to observe the affections of his natural will, to note what he loves or hates, and then, by applying the test of Revealed truth, to judge whether his affection be good or evil; thus he is able to distinguish between right and wrong. In this manner he can form distinct intellectual ideas, arranged in a certain regular order, which condition of mind is termed rational thought, or understanding proper.
Hence, too, is derived his faculty of articulate speech. Such distinct ideas put themselves forth in distinct modifications or articulations of sound, arranged in an order corresponding to the order of his thoughts; which modifications of sound are called words, and an assemblage of such, arranged in a certain order, make a sentence,—and sentences combined make human language. But a brute has no such articulate speech, because he has no such distinct ideas, no rational thought derived from self-observation. For ideas, it is to be observed,—at least such rational ideas as produce articulate or distinct sounds—are formed in the superior degree of the mind: they are not mere impressions such as are made on the mind from without—but they are, as it were, distilled from such impressions—they are formed by reflection upon impressions and other knowledges. A brute, not possessing the higher degree or region of the mind, whence to look down and observe and reflect upon his impressions, is consequently unable to form any distinct or rational ideas, and thence is unable to utter any corresponding modifications or articulations of sound. It can merely
