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A CONCOMITANT OF REASON AND LIBERTY.
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rider's urgings,—to do his utmost, and pass, if he can, his competitor. But what he does, is but the effect of momentary excitement, or is, at most, an instinct urging him to press on: it is not the result of any proper consciousness of his own powers, or of any comparison between himself and his rival. Consequently, when, after the race, both horses are brought up to the stand, the winner, though he may look excited, shows no pride, or consciousness of superiority, nor does he look askance and contemptuously at his rival. Both horses stand innocently together, champing their bits in unison, the one as content as the other,—and this is as it should be, for each has done his best. Why has the winning horse no pride or vanity, no self-love? Plainly, because he has no, power of self-observation or self-reflection—no power of observing and reflecting upon his own good qualities, and comparing them with the inferior points of his neighbour. He has no faculty of self-reflection, because, as before shown, the inferior animals have only a single range of thought—only one degree or region of mind; they have not, as man has, a spiritual mind, a second or higher range or plane of the mind, from which they can look down upon the lower, and thus see and observe themselves, and note their own thoughts and feelings, and so form judgments and conclusion—in a word, carry on that operation of mind, which is called reasoning. This different constitution, then, of the animal-mind is the cause that the inferior animals have not and can not have that self-love, which has been described as the root of all evil. But man, by the superior constitution of his mind, having the