culties in regard to the Divine wisdom and goodness, arising from the existence of evil and suffering in the world; and this, by showing that all such evil and suffering are derived, not from God, but from man; and we have endeavoured, moreover, to remove difficulties arising from another source, namely, from certain expressions and statements found in the Sacred Scriptures. Now, if we have been successful in these endeavours—if the reader have found his mind convinced—then, plainly, Acknowledgment should follow—acknowledgment of God, and of His infinite wisdom, power, and goodness. But to this it may perhaps be replied, "If I am convinced, is not that a sufficient acknowledgment? is not the very state of not denying but assenting to the truths which have been presented, a state of acknowledgment?" Upon this we would observe, that a state of intellectual non-denial or of conviction is not precisely the same with a state of acknowledgment. The difference between them is like that between the theoretical and the practical. A man may not deny the existence of the Divine Being,—he may even have a general vague belief of it, and recognise the fact as true enough, when he hears the subject mentioned; but this is not Acknowledgment. The former is a kind of negative state: the latter, a positive and practical one. The acknowledgment of God is a real and practical belief, habitually pervading our thoughts, and influencing all our views of life, for time and for eternity.
To show the difference between a vague idea of the existence of God, and a sincere acknowledgment of it, we may instance the case of Voltaire. Voltaire did not deny the existence of God: he even built a chapel,
