selves. There may be another man who feels exactly like me, thinks like me, and acts like me; suppose even he had the same name and the same kind of possessions, he would not be myself."46
"True, Kūtadanta," answered Buddha, "he would not be thyself. Now, tell me, is the person who goes to school one, and that same person when he has finished his schooling another? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands and feet cut off?"47
"They are the same," was the reply.48
"Then sameness is constituted by continuity only?" asked the Tathāgata.49
"Not only by continuity," said Kūtadanta, "but also and mainly by identity of character."50
"Very well," concluded the Buddha, "then thou agreest that persons can be the same, in the same sense as two flames of the same kind are called the same; and thou must recognize that in this sense another man of the same character and product of the same karma is the same as thou."51
"Well, I do," said the Brahman.52
The Buddha continued: "And in this same sense alone art thou the same to-day as yesterday. Thy nature is not constituted by the matter of which thy body consists, but by thy sankhāras, the forms of the body, of sensations, of thoughts. Thy person is the combination of the sankhāras. Wherever they are, thou art. Whithersoever they go, thou goest. Thus thou wilt recognize in a certain sense an identity of thy self, and in another sense a difference. But he who does not recognize the identity should deny all identity, and should say that the questioner is no longer the same person as he who a minute after receives the answer. Now consider the continuation of thy personality, which is preserved in thy karma. Dost thou call it death and annihilation, or life and continued life?"53
