141 In that case, the plurality (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ) said at 466–9 [1]–[7]:
The common law recognises that people have an interest in their reputation and that their reputation may be damaged by the publication of defamatory matter about them to others. In Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd Windeyer J explained that compensation for an injury to reputation operates as a vindication of the plaintiff to the public, as well as a consolation.
Spencer Bower recognised the breadth of the term "reputation" as it applies to natural persons and gave as its meaning:
[T]he esteem in which he is held, or the goodwill entertained towards him, or the confidence reposed in him by other persons, whether in respect of his personal character, his private or domestic life, his public, social, professional, or business qualifications, qualities, competence, dealings, conduct, or status, or his financial credit …
A person's reputation may therefore be said to be injured when the esteem in which that person is held by the community is diminished in some respect.
Lord Atkin proposed such a general test in Sim v Stretch, namely that statements might be defamatory if "the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of rightthinking members of society generally". An earlier test asked whether the words were likely to injure the reputation of a plaintiff by exposing him (or her) to hatred, contempt or ridicule but it had come to be considered as too narrow. It was also accepted, as something of an exception to the requirement that there be damage to a plaintiff's reputation, that matter might be defamatory if it caused a plaintiff to be shunned or avoided, which is to say excluded from society.
The common law test of defamatory matter propounded by Lord Atkin was applied in Slatyer v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd, although Griffith CJ expressed some concern about the ambiguity of the expression "right thinking members of the community". The general test, stated as whether the published matter is likely to lead an ordinary reasonable person to think the less of a plaintiff, was confirmed by this court in Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd, Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd and by Callinan and Heydon JJ in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic. Gummow and Hayne JJ in John Fairfax referred to the likelihood that the imputations might cause "ordinary decent folk" in the community to think the less of the plaintiff.
Putting aside Lord Atkin's additional requirement of being "right-thinking", the hypothetical audience, that is to say the referees of the issue of whether a person has been defamed, has been regarded as composed of ordinary reasonable people, whom Spencer Bower described as "of ordinary intelligence, experience, and education". Such persons have also been described as "not avid for scandal" and "fair-minded". They are expected to bring to the matter in question their general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs.
In Reader's Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb, Brennan J explained that any standards to be applied by the hypothetical referees, to an assessment of the effect of imputations, are those of the general community:
"Whether the alleged libel is established depends upon the understanding of the hypothetical referees who are taken to have a uniform view of the meaning of the language used, and upon the standards, moral or social, by which they evaluate the imputation they understand to have been made. They are taken to share a moral or social standard by which to judge the defamatory character of
