Page:Greenwich v Latham (2024, FCA).pdf/55

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can be harmed by a fresh defamatory allegation. An example is provided by serious allegations made against a politician of a rival party. I have recently held that it does not follow from the fact that a publishee is a political opponent of the claimant, that they will think no worse of the claimant if told that he or she has covered up sexual abuse: Barron v Collins [2017] EWHC 162 (QB) at [56]. The same line of reasoning is applicable to the different facts of this case. As Mr Bennett puts it, if someone is hated for their sexuality or their left-wing views, that does not mean that they cannot be libelled by being accused of condoning the vandalisation of a war memorial. It can add to the list of reasons to revile her."

The accusation of engaging upon, supporting and encouraging a campaign of online abuse and harassment of a 16-year old girl was a fresh allegation that would have made readers of the Article think worse of the claimant.

173 The parties in this case agreed that in an appropriate case, a claimant can also rely upon the likely "percolation" or grapevine effect of defamatory publications. As Steyn J noted in Riley v Sivier at [103] such effects have been "immeasurably enhanced by social media and modern methods of electronic communication".

174 The parties also agreed that when a court comes to the question of the reputational damage caused in the minds of publishees, and whether that harm is serious, the court is not limited to looking at the effect among ordinary, reasonable, right-thinking members of the community. The court looks at the actual effect, as Dr Collins put it, "no matter who it came from, including from the deranged". (I note that Mr Smark's concession to similar effect is at pages 116–17 of the transcript, although it is incorrectly attributed to Dr Collins.) Consideration

175 Mr Smark contended that Mr Greenwich had not proved that the publication of the primary tweet has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation within the meaning of's 10A(1) of Act.

176 Mr Smark's first submission was that the "inherent seriousness" of the pleaded imputation on Mr Greenwich's reputation is low. Counsel asked rhetorically, "[o]ther than conveying Mr Latham's own sense of disgust about homosexual sex, why would the material cause people to think less of Mr Greenwich?"

177 That point can be dealt with immediately. The answer to the rhetorical question is that the primary tweet conveyed more than "Mr Latham's own sense of disgust about homosexual sex". As I have found, it conveyed that Mr Greenwich engages in disgusting sexual activities.


Greenwich v Latham [2024] FCA 1050
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