184 Dr Collins agreed that it cannot be excluded that the direct cause of the posting of some of those comments and messages may have been other media coverage, but the tweets referred to in [182] and [183] above undoubtedly constitute evidence that should be taken into account when assessing the question of serious harm. But in any event, as Warby J said in Barron v Vines at [48], having formed the view (at [47]) that he was not persuaded that it would be safe to conclude that any of the tweets relied on by the claimant probably flowed from the interview with the defendant that was sued on:
It does not follow, of course, that there were no tweets or other social media comments or postings that did flow from the interview. Nor are social media or online postings necessary in order to infer as I do that, on the balance of probabilities, a broadcast making allegations of this kind did lead to "percolation" of those allegations beyond the immediate audience. The "hidden springs" still exist in the era of social media. It is not yet the case that all social interaction is visible online. People still speak to one another by telephone and face to face.
185 In light of Mr Smark's appropriate concession that it is obvious that much of the comments and messages relied on by Mr Greenwich were in a causal sense a response to the primary tweet, no purpose would be served in me trawling through them all, and expressing seriatim a view about which comment or message is or is not to be regarded as having been caused by the primary tweet.
186 In my view, there was no break in the chain of causation between the primary tweet and a preponderance of the communications. As Dr Collins said, and I agree:
Now, we make the point … that, of course, it cannot be excluded that some of the messages to which I've taken your Honour, particularly those from the later period and particularly after the concerns notice, might have been only indirectly caused by the original tweet and then the comments in the Daily Telegraph, and that appears to be the case because some of them refer to the fact of Mr Greenwich taking action against Mr Latham. We say to your Honour that your Honour would take all of those matters into account as evidence of actual damage to a loss of standing to Mr Greenwich that is causally connected, in the ordinary tortious sense, to the original posts.
… And we set out what we would submit your Honour ought to find by way of the chain of causation … all of which is entirely foreseeable. There's the original tweet. That then gives rise to foreseeable publicity. There's then the [DT] quotes which are causally connected to the original tweet. There's then the republication of those quotes in the Daily Telegraph, which was, of course, what Mr Latham intended, as agreed on the pleading. There's then foreseeable publicity arising out of the publication of the quotes. Mr Latham then "doubles down", in the language of some of the publicity about the controversy.
187 And it can also obviously enough be inferred that there was a "percolation" effect of the type referred to in the cases.
