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attempt to provoke the Party and to get it involved, as quickly as possible, into some big struggle, so as to prevent the Party from properly organising itself. I then advised the leading comrades, on behalf of the Executive, not to allow themselves to be drawn into a decisive struggle so quickly. Naturally, we were not such doctrinaires as to ignore the fact that not everything depends upon us alone, but upon the general situation, and upon the position and attitude of the enemy. We were of the opinion that the Party be given the greatest possible length of time for consolidating its ranks, Upon this question there were no differences of opinions between us. It was quite clear that the union of two Parties, let us say of 100,000 and 400,000 respectively, cannot run along smoothly without any friction or retrogression to Centrist or semi-Centrist ailments. Bearing in mind the entire past of the German movement, we saw quite plainly that the danger for this Party could never be so great from the Left as it would be from the Right. (Approval.)
We have seen how the Spartakusbund, even before the unification, had missed such a situation as the Kapp-Putsch. This was evidence of the fact that our Party has not been active enough in that historical movement. The same thing in a larger degree was the case with the Independent Socialist Party. On looking back upon the history of the Party, we saw the danger of disease threatening from this side. At the time of the Second Congress we told the German comrades: "We do not understand why every time when a movement meets with defeat in your country you immediately declare it to have been a putsch," We said: "Don't come along every time with the same word, putsch."
We advise against undue haste, against jumping into battle without adequate preparation. But, on looking back upon the road traversed by the German working class, we cannot say that it has all been
