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Party, which had already joined us, for the simple reason that we thought the situation in the French Party different from that of the Italian Party. At the time when Cachin and Frossard were at Moscow, we had in France a Party that had not yet experienced its first split. The French Scheidemanns—Thomas and Renaudels—were still active. We had to take into consideration that the Communist Group within the French Party was relatively weak and its leaders, without an exception, were all in jail. For this reason we considered that a much milder attitude must be taken towards the French Party as compared with the Italian Party, which was affiliated to the Third International, which had officially participated in the Second Congress, and assumed obligations which it unfortunately fails to fulfil.
The agreement with Renaudel contained one point, namely, that in case Longuet accepts the conditions laid down by the Second Congress, we would recommend to the next Congress to make an exception for Longuet. This was the concession asked from us by Renaudel on behalf of Loriot, to which we agreed. And we have never regretted it. When Longuet delivered his famous speech in Halle, it was clear that Longuet could not agree to the 21 conditions.
The French comrades insisted, however, that it be shown documentarily to the French workers that we were ready to make an exception for Longuet. I believe that in doing so we have acted quite properly, and Serati is altogether wrong when he asserts that he also would have been able to remain in the Party if given a similar right. Anyhow, Longuet did not accept these conditions, and the Party gave him up.
Even after Longuet's declaration that he would not accept the conditions, Frossard implored Longuet not to leave the Party. Those comrades who attended the Congress at Tours will readily recollect that the Executive at the very last moment addressed a telegram to the Congress, taking a very sharp atti-
