Page:Grigory Zinoviev - Twelve Days in Germany (1921).pdf/6

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The German bourgeoisie and the Scheidemannists know perfectly well that the Right Wing of the Independents is their ally, their reserve force, their hope for the immediate future. The leaders of the German bourgeoisie and the Scheidemannists were undoubtedly anxious to avoid anything that could embarrass the sorely tried leaders of the Right Wing of the Independents at the forthcoming Party congress at Halle. The position was such that, had I been forbidden to enter Germany, the position of these leaders would undoubtedly have been rendered more difficult under the prevailing circumstances.

Let us see how things stood. The congress at Halle had to settle one question only? Is the Independent Party going to join the Third International? To refuse to admit a representative of the Third International, when that question had to be discussed, would be equivalent to a confession that the bourgeoisie and the Scheidemannists, who had it in their power to admit or to refuse me, were supporting those who do not want the Independents to join the Third International. Permission to enter the country was granted to the Russian Menshevik Martov and to the French representative of the "Centre," Longuet, who were going to Halle in order to save the leaders of the Right Wing. Had the representative of the Third International been refused that permission, our supporters would only have had to point out that fact, and it would have been clear to everybody that the bourgeoisie and the Scheidemannists were in league against the "Left Independents." This would have been far too disadvantageous to Hilferding and Co. They had to choose the lesser of two evils. The other reason was undoubtedly the fact that part of the bourgeoisie—the dull-witted part of it—thought that a split in the Independent Party would be to the advantage of the bourgeoisie. It was precisely that part of the bourgeoisie which had seized on the elementary idea that, if there was to be a split in any Labour party, it was always bound to be to the advantage of the bourgeoisie. Such was the notion of this section of the bourgeoisie, far removed from the subtler idea, that splits are not all alike and that the clearing of a Labour party of elements of the right and "trimmers" may work out in favour of the revolution and not of the counter-revolution. The wise-