Page:Groff v. DeJoy.pdf/20

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Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

“more than de minimis” standard “literally” or in a manner that undermines Hardison’s references to “substantial” cost.^[1] Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. With the benefit of comprehensive briefing and oral argument, we agree.^[2]

III

We hold that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffice to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase. In describing an employer’s “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better explains the decision. We therefore, like the parties, understand Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context

↑ At the certiorari stage, the Government argued against review by noting that Government employees receive “at least as much protection for religious-accommodation claims [under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)] as [under] any interpretation of Title VII.” Brief in Opposition 9. Courts have not always agreed on how RFRA’s cause of action—which does not rely on employment status—interacts with Title VII’s cause of action, and the Third Circuit has treated Title VII as exclusively governing at least some employment-related claims brought by Government employees. Compare Francis v. Mineta, 505 F. 3d 266, 271 (CA3 2007), with Tagore v. United States, 735 F. 3d 324, 330–331 (CA5 2013) (federal employee’s RFRA claim could proceed even though de minimis standard foreclosed Title VII claim). Because Groff did not bring a RFRA claim, we need not resolve today whether the Government is correct that RFRA claims arising out of federal employment are not displaced by Title VII.
↑ In addition to suggesting that Hardison be revisited, some Justices have questioned whether Hardison (which addresses the pre-1972 EEOC Guidelines) binds courts interpreting the current version of Title VII. See Abercrombie, 575 U. S., at 787, n. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As explained below, because we—like the Solicitor General—construe Hardison as consistent with the ordinary meaning of “undue hardship,” we need not reconcile any divergence between Hardison and the statutory text.

[1] At the certiorari stage, the Government argued against review by noting that Government employees receive “at least as much protection for religious-accommodation claims [under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)] as [under] any interpretation of Title VII.” Brief in Opposition 9. Courts have not always agreed on how RFRA’s cause of action—which does not rely on employment status—interacts with Title VII’s cause of action, and the Third Circuit has treated Title VII as exclusively governing at least some employment-related claims brought by Government employees. Compare Francis v. Mineta, 505 F. 3d 266, 271 (CA3 2007), with Tagore v. United States, 735 F. 3d 324, 330–331 (CA5 2013) (federal employee’s RFRA claim could proceed even though de minimis standard foreclosed Title VII claim). Because Groff did not bring a RFRA claim, we need not resolve today whether the Government is correct that RFRA claims arising out of federal employment are not displaced by Title VII.

[2] In addition to suggesting that Hardison be revisited, some Justices have questioned whether Hardison (which addresses the pre-1972 EEOC Guidelines) binds courts interpreting the current version of Title VII. See Abercrombie, 575 U. S., at 787, n. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As explained below, because we—like the Solicitor General—construe Hardison as consistent with the ordinary meaning of “undue hardship,” we need not reconcile any divergence between Hardison and the statutory text.

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