Opinion of the Court
Both of these suggestions go too far. We have no reservations in saying that a good deal of the EEOC’s guidance in this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected by our clarifying decision today. After all, as a public advocate for employee rights, much of the EEOC’s guidance has focused on what should be accommodated. Accordingly, today’s clarification may prompt little, if any, change in the agency’s guidance explaining why no undue hardship is imposed by temporary costs, voluntary shift swapping, occasional shift swapping, or administrative costs. See 29 CFR §1605.2(d). But it would not be prudent to ratify in toto a body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the benefit of the clarification we adopt today. What is most important is that “undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and courts should resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the context of an employer’s business in the commonsense manner that it would use in applying any such test.
D
The erroneous de minimis interpretation of Hardison may have had the effect of leading courts to pay insufficient attention to what the actual text of Title VII means with regard to several recurring issues. Since we are now brushing away that mistaken view of Hardison’s holding, clarification of some of those issues—in line with the parties’ agreement in this case—is in order.
First, on the second question presented, both parties agree that the language of Title VII requires an assessment of a possible accommodation’s effect on “the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j); see 35 F. 4th, at 177–178 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). As the Solicitor General put it, not all “impacts on coworkers … are relevant,” but only “coworker impacts” that go on to “affec[t] the conduct of the business.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–104. So an accommodation’s effect on co-workers may have ramifications for the conduct of the employer’s business, but a court
