Page:Groff v. DeJoy.pdf/4

Syllabus

to soften its impact, cautioning against extending the phrase to cover such things as the “administrative costs” involved in reworking schedules, the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of premium wages for a substitute,” and “voluntary substitutes and swaps” when they are not contrary to a “bona fide seniority system.” §§1605.2(e)(1), (2). Yet some courts have rejected even the EEOC’s gloss on “de minimis,” rejecting accommodations the EEOC’s guidelines consider to be ordinarily required. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that Hardison does not compel courts to read the “more than de minimis” standard “literally” or in a manner that undermines Hardison’s references to “substantial” cost. Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. Pp. 12–15.

(b) The Court holds that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffice to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase. In describing an employer’s “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better explains the decision. The Court understands Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business. This fact-specific inquiry comports with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in ordinary speech. Pp. 15–21.

(1) To determine what an employer must prove to defend a denial of a religious accommodation under Title VII, the Court begins with Title VII’s text. The statutory term, “hardship,” refers to, at a minimum, “something hard to bear” and suggests something more severe than a mere burden. If Title VII said only that an employer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not escape liability simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of additional costs. Adding the modifier “undue” means that the requisite burden or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” level. Understood in this way, “undue hardship” means something very different from a burden that is merely more than de minimis, i.e., “very small or trifling.” The ordinary meaning of “undue hardship” thus points toward a standard closer to Hardison’s references to “substantial additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. Further, the Court’s reading of the statutory term comports with pre-1972 EEOC decisions, so nothing in that history plausibly suggests that “undue hardship” in Title VII should be read to mean anything less than its meaning in ordinary use. Cf. George v. McDonough, 596 U. S. ___, ___. And no support exists in other factors discussed by the parties for reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line. Pp. 16–18.

(2) The parties agree that the “de minimis” test is not right, but they differ in the alternative language they propose. The Court thinks