Language is subject to leveling forces. When a word acquires a strong meaning it becomes useful in rhetoric. A single word conveys a powerful image. When plantation owners held blacks in chattel slavery, when 100 years later governors declared “segregation now, segregation forever”, everyone knew what a “racist” was. The strength of the image invites use. To obtain emotional impact, orators employed the term without the strong justification, shading its meaning just a little. So long as any part of the old meaning lingers, there is a tendency to invoke the word for its impact rather than to convey a precise meaning. We may regret that the language is losing the meaning of a word, especially when there is no ready substitute.
Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988).
The observations in Stevens are almost thirty-five years old. Matters have only gotten worse since then, undoubtedly to the dismay of English language purists. In many walks of life, including academia it seems, civility and professionalism have taken a backseat to unnecessary discord and divisiveness, with terms like “racist” being bandied about with reckless abandon. “But we serve in a court of law rather than of language and cannot insist that speakers cling to older meanings.” Id. Nor can a court legislate sensible behavior.
What the Court can and must do is determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation or Fourteenth Amendment due process claims and whether either side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If there remains a jury question on a claim, the question then becomes whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.[1]
- ↑ The Court analyzes these issues sequentially because, to overcome the qualified immunity defense, plaintiffs must establish that (1) “based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred,” and (2) “the violation involved a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 695–96 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Although “the court may address these prongs in any order … if the plaintiff cannot make both showings, the offic[ial] is entitled to qualified immunity.” Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 412 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). Hence, if “no constitutional violation occurred, the Court need not address [the parties’] arguments regarding qualified immunity.” Fox v. Corrigan, 161 F. App’x 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1988) (observing that if “no constitutional violation occurred … the court would never reach the qualified immunity question”).
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Case 2:21-cv-00039 Document 90 Filed 12/01/22 Page 9 of 27 PageID #: 8921
