6
Sect. 1.
Action.
ruled that a release of " all actions " would not bar execution upon a judgment already obtained; secus a release of " all suits," for without " suit or prayer " none could have execution (t).
Sect. 2.—Cause of Action.
Meaning of term.
3. The popular meaning of the expression " cause of action " is that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint (a). Strictly speaking, however, " every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse " (b), forms an essential part of "the cause of action," which "accrues" upon the happening of the latest of such facts (c). Consequently, in any particular case, "the cause of action," strictly so called, can only be said to arise within a certain local area, when all such material facts arise within that area, when (as it is often stated somewhat tautologically) the " whole " cause of action so arises. Thus it was held (d) that the purely common law jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court in London and the county court jurisdiction under sect. 60 of the repealed statute of 1846 (e), being in each case limited to causes of action arising within a particular area, did not attach unless the whole cause of action arose within that area. It may, however, be that, upon the true construction of a given statute, the expression " a cause of action " ought to bear a narrower interpretation and be restricted to the popular meaning indicated above. Thus after several conflicting decisions (f) upon sect. 18 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (g), the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas differing upon the point, it was finally held (h) by a majority of all the judges that the expression in that section must be treated as bearing such narrower interpretation. With reference to the cases cited above as to the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court and county courts, it should be noted that sect. 12 of the Mayor's Court Procedure Act, 1857 (i),
- (t) Altham's Case (1610), 8 Co. Rep. 150 b.
- (a) Jackson v. Spittall (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 542.
- (b) Cooke V. Gill (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 107; Read v. Brown (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 128.
- (c) Coburn v. Colledge, [1897] 1 Q. B. 702.
- (d) As to the Mayor's Court, see Cooke v. Gill, Read v. Brown, supra ; Gold v. Turner (1874), L. R. 10 C. P. 149; Bowler v. Barberton Development Syndicate, [1897] 1 Q. B. 164; as to the county court, Wilde v. Sheridan (1852), 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 260; Borthwick v. Walton (1855), 24 L. J. (C. P.) 83; Hernaman v. Smith (1855), 24 L. J (EX.) 175. See also Whitehead v. Butt (1891), 7 T. L. R. 609, and Payne v. Hogg, [1900] 2 Q. B. 43, similar decisions upon the words of sect. 6 of the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. cxxx.).
- (e) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95.
- (f) In favour of the wider interpretation, Sichel v. Borch (1864), 33 L. J. (EX.) 179; Allhusen v. Malgarejo (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 340; Cherry v. Thompson (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 573; in favour of the narrower interpretation, Fife v. Round (1858), 6 W. R. 282; Jackson v. Spittall (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 542, and cases there referred to. In Durham v. Spence (1870), L. R. 6 Ex. 46, the Court were divided in opinion.
- (g) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76.
- (h) Vaughan v. Weldon (1874), L. R. IO C. P. 47, approving Jackson v. Spittall, supra.
- (i) 20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii. s. 12. See thereon Hawes v. Paveley (1876), 1 C. P. D. 418.
