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Part II. — In what Cases an Action will lie.

15

Sect. 3.

Damnum absque injuria.

consequences are governed by laws other than those which municipal Courts administer (c). Accordingly, whether the transaction constituting an act of state be one between two independent States or between a State and an individual foreigner, no cause of action arises by reason of it, and redress must be sought by other means (d).

Volenti non fit injuria.

18. In some cases a person who has suffered damage by another's wrongful or negligent act may be precluded from recovering by the rule expressed in the maxim Volenti (e) non fit injuria. One who invites or consents to the doing of an act which occasions him a wrong cannot be heard to complain of it (f). Thus at common law no cause of action arises in respect of personal injuries sustained by a person who, with full knowledge of a source of danger, voluntarily undertakes to incur the risk of exposing himself to it (g). So a person who contracts to do work which is intrinsically dangerous, such as the manufacture of chemicals which produce noxious fumes or of articles liable to sudden explosions, must be taken to voluntarily subject himself to the risks which inevitably accompany such work, and cannot complain of any harm he may suffer (h); and a person who trespassed in a wood with knowledge that there were spring guns there, was held to have no cause of action for personal injuries suffered by him, for, having voluntarily exposed himself to the mischief, he must take the consequences of his own act (i).

The maxim, however, does not apply where a person, having a right to expect to find a place free from danger, voluntarily goes there knowing it to be in some degree unsafe, provided the danger is not so great that no reasonable person would have incurred it (j). In such a case it does not lie in the mouth of the person through

(c) Cook v. Sprigg [1899] A. C. 572; Salaman v. Secretary of State for India, [1906] 1 K. B. 613.
(d) See cases cited in note (c), supra ; Buron v. Denman (1848), 2 Ex. 167; East India Co. v. Syed Ally (1827), cited 7 Moo. Ind. App. 531; Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co. (1793), 2 Ves. Jun. 56; West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K. B. 391, 409; Doss v. Secretary of State for India (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 509; Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859), 7 Moo. Ind. App. 476; Sirdar Bhagwan Singh v. Secretary of State for India (1874), L. R. 2 Ind. App. 38.
(e) Note that the rule is volenti, not scienti, non fit injuria.
(f) Gould v. Oliver (1837), 4 Bing. N. C. 134; Smith v. Baker, [1891] A. C. 325.
(g) Smith v. Baker, supra; Membery v. Great Western Rail. Co. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 179, 186; Yarmouth v. France (1888), 19 Q. B. D. 647, 657; Thomas v. Quartermaine (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 685, 696; Williams v. Birmingham Battery Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 338.
(h) Smith v. Baker, supra; Thomas v. Quartermaine, supra. See further the title Master and Servant, post.
(i) Hott v. Wilkes (1820), 3 B. & Ald. 304, 311, 314; compare Bird v. Holbrook (1828), 4 Bing. 628.
(j) Clayards v. Dethick (1848), 12 Q. B. 439; Osborne v. London and North Western Rail. Co. (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 220; Baddeley v. Earl Granville (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 423; Lax v. Corporation of Darlington (1879), 5 Ex. D. 28; Thompson v. North Eastern Rail. Co. (1860), 2 B. & S. 106; Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co. .(1839), 11 A. & E. 223; Winch v. Conservators of River Thames (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 378; Holmes v. Clarke (1861), 6 H. & N. 349; Wyatt v. Great Western Rail Co. (1865), 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 204.