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Part
IT.
Competency of Parties.
149
The converse proposition similarly holds good that what a person cannot do himself he cannot do by means of an agent (i). It is only necessary, speaking generally, to ascertain who is legally competent to act or contract (J), in order to learn who is competent to be a
Sect.
1.
Principals.
principal.
There are, however, three exceptions to the general rule that a person may do by means of an agent whatever he has power to do himself (1) Where the capacity to do the act arises by virtue of a special custom which requires it to be done in person (k) (2) Where the transaction is required by statute to be evidenced by the signature of the principal himself (l) (3) Where the competency to do the act arises by virtue of the holding of some public office or by virtue of some power, authority, or duty of a personal nature and requiring skill or discretion for its
Exceptions.
exercise (m).
The following act as principals
classes of persons are incompetent to contract or Persons incompetent.
(1) An alien enem}^ during the period of hostilities with the country of which he is a subject (n) (2) A convict during the period that he is serving his sentence (o). Persons with The following classes of persons have only a limited capacity to limited capacity. contract or act as principals
329. Subject to certain exceptions, an infant cannot be a principal, and the agent cannot bind him in respect of contracts made on his behalf, nor can the infant himself ratify them after Bevan v. Wtbh, [1901] 2 Ch. 59. an agent (to whom no reasonable objection can be taken, and on the agent undertaking not to use information) to examine partnership books under the Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Yict. c. 39), s. 24 (9) compare the Limited Partnerships Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 24), s. 6 (1). (?) Bateman v. Mid-Wales Rail. Co. (1866), L. E. 1 0. P. 499; PoultoiiY. Loudon and South Western Rail. Co. (1867), L. E. 2 Q. B. 534; Ashhury Raihuay Carriaye and Iron Co. v. Riche (1875), L. E. 7 H. L. 653 The Montreal Assurance Co. Y. McGillivray (1859), 13 Moo. P. C. 0. 87. (./) See title Contract. [k] Combes Case (1614), 9 Co. Eep. 75 a. An infant's power to convey by feoffment under custom of gavelkind could not be devolved on an attorney. 14), s. 6; Williams Y.Mason (?) E.y.. Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. 4, c. Hirst y. West Ridiny Union Bankiny Co,, [1901] 2 K. B. 560. (1873) 28 L. T. 232 Compare Re Whitley Partners, Ltd. (1886), 32 Ch. D. 337 Siuift v. Jewshury An agent cannot sign consent for a party to be added (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 301. under Ord. 16, r. 11, of the Eules of the Supreme Court, which requires the party's a document)
Foster y. Fijfe, [1896] 2 Q. B. 104
A partner may employ
,
,
own consent
in writing " {Fricker v.
But parGrutten, [1896] 2 Ch. 649). are " signed by the solicitor " within the County Court Eules, 1889 [France v. Button, [1891] 2 Q. B. 208), and in general an agent may sign where the statute does not'expressly or impliedly require personal signature of the principal (see, e.y., Dennisoii v. Jeffs, [1896] 1 Ch. 611). (m) Re Great Southern Mysore Gold Mininy Co. (1883), 48 L. T. 11 (the nomination of an official liquidator by a judge cannot be performed by an agent). (?0 O'Mealey v. Wilson (1808), 1 Camp. 482. The position of aliens is now governed by the Naturalisation Act, 1870 (33 Vict. c. 14), see title Aliens. (o) During this period he cannot enforce any of his existing rights, or employ an agent. But the Crown may appoint an administrator of his propert}'- with wide powers of managing his estate, who is answerable for loss arising to the convict's estate through want of care on his part, see Forfeiture Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23) ; Carr v. Anderson, [1903] 2 Ch. 279.
ticulars of costs signed
by a
Van
solicitor's clerk
Infants.
