— Part
179
Ratification.
VII.
Sect. 4. 386. The receipt of purchase-money is generally sufficient evidence of ratification of a sale, but not if it is received in Manner of ignorance of the true facts (s). Where a solicitor, whose name Ratification. had been used by another on a bill without authority, received a Evidence of nominal sum, and was told it w^as a formality, whereas it was to ratification. assist a fraud, this was held not to be a ratification of the act, and he was liable only to the extent of the amount received by him {t). In the case of an assault by a railwa}^ company's servant in taking the plaintiff, a passenger, into custody, it was held that the fact of the company's solicitor appearing to conduct the charge was no evidence of a ratification by the company {u) While a ratification must be clear and must bear distinct reference to the facts of the particular case, it need not necessarily be proved by positive acts of adoption. In certain cases it is sufficient evidence of ratification that the intended principal, having all material facts brought to his knowledge and knowing that he is being regarded as having accepted the position of principal, takes no steps to disown that character within reasonable time, or adopts no means of asserting his rights at the earliest period possible {a), .
387. Acquiescence may take place before or at the time of or after Katification by acquiesthe act acquiesced in. If before, it may be said to operate by way cence. of estoppel, as w^here a person having a right, and seeing another person about to infringe it, stands by in such a way as to induce the person committing the act of infringement to believe that he assents to it. In such a case he is estopped from afterwards complaining of the act (b). Acquiescence after the act, as evidence of its ratification, requires more consideration. Acquiescence, like acts of adoption, cannot avail when the contract or act is ultra vires the alleged principal (c), or is made or done before the alleged principal came into existence even where such principal has derived advantage from the services rendered (e). The acquiescence must be acquiescence in the particular facts and be incapable of referring to another set of facts. Thus where an agent in China for the sale of a ship employed, with the principal's knowledge, a sub-agent in Japan, who, unable to sell at the time, (s) The Bonita (1861), 5 L. T. 141 Freeman v. Rosher (1849), 13 Q. B. 780. See also Cornwal v. Wilson (1750), 1 Ves. Sen. 509. {t) Marsh v. Joseph, [1897] 1 Gh. 213 (to constitute a ratification there must be full knowledge and unequivocal adoption after knowledge, per Lord Russell,
C. J., at p. 246.) {u) Eastern Counties Rail. Co. v. Broom (1851), Vestry of St. Abbots (1900), 64 J. P. 548.
6Excli. 314.
But
see Carter v.
Mary
The Australia (1859), 13 Moo. P. 0. C. 132 Jackson v. Jacob (1837), 3 c.) 869 La Banque Jacques-Cartier v. La Banque d' Epargne de la Cite et du District de Montreal Robinson v. Oleadow (1835), (1887), 13 App. Gas. Ill 2 Bmg. (N. c.) 156 Hall v. Laver (1842), 1 Hare, 571. The burden of proving such ratification rests on the person alleging it, who must also prove full know(a)
Bing. (n.
ledge of facts {Wall v. Cockerell (1863), 10 H. L. Gas. 229, 243). (b) De Bussche v. Alt (1878), 8 Gh. D. 286, ?)er Thesiger, L.J., at p. 314; Duke of Leeds v. Earl of Amherst (1846), 2 Ph. 117, 123. (c) See p. 174, ante. (d) See p. 176, ante. (e)
Re Rotherham Alum
atid Chemical Co. (1883), 25 Gh.
D. 103.
N
2
