— Part
XL Duration and
Termination of Agency.
233
Sect. 4, if there was no such obligation, then the winding up of a company or dissohition of a partnership firm constituting the principal will Termination put an end to the contract of agency (/), unless (in the case of a by OperaAn tion of L aw, partnership) the contract was not of a personal character (g) undertaking to continue the agent's employment will not, as a .
general rule, be presumed (li). Where there is an agreement for a fixed period, it is not dissolved by the principal discontinuing the business on the ground of its unprofitable character (i), nor in consequence of the principal ceasing to carry on business under agreement with competitors {j).
489. Except
as stated above with regard to irrevocable authori- Death, a contract of agency is determined by the principal's death (1), ^^^^^^q^^^i ^^^^ lunacy or unsoundness of mind (m). The representatives of a ° deceased principal may, however, ratify a contract made by the agent subsequent to his death if they think fit, though, in the absence of a ratification, they are not bound by it (n). And as regards any power of attorney given after December 31st, 1881, under which any person makes any payment or does any act in good faith, such person is not liable by reason that, unknown to him, before the payment or act, the donor of the power had died, become lunatic, of unsound mind, or bankrupt, or revoked the power, but the same remedy is available against the payee of any money so paid as would have been available against the payer had the payment not been made by him (o). Thelunacy of a principal determines the agency as between the principal and agent, but is not per se a revocation (p) with regard to athird person dealing with the agent without knowledge of the lunacy {q). ties
(A:),
^
Maitland (1864), 5 B. & S. 840 (the dissolution of an insurance compa.ny dissolved the agency agreement); Northey v. Trevillion (1902), 7 Com. Cas. 201. (/) Taskerv. Shepherd (1861), 6 H. & N. 575; Salton v. New Beeston Cycle Co., [1900] 1 Ch. 43 Friend v. Young, [1897] 2 Ch. 421. (^r) Phillips V. Alhamhra Palace Co., [1901] 1 K. B. 59. (h) See cases cited in note (e), p. 232, ante. (?) Nielans v. Cuthbertson (1891), 7 T. L. E. 516. Ij) Ogdens, Ltd. v. Nelson, [1905] A. 0. 109. (k) See p. 228, ante. (l) Blades v. Free (1829), 9 B. & C. 167 (death of husband determining the implied authority of wife to bind his estate for necessaries) Lepard v. Vernon Wallace v. Cooh (1804), 5 Esp. 118 ; Whitehead v. Lord (1813), 2 Yes. & B. 51 PooIy. Pool (1889), 61 L. T. 401 FarroivY. Wilson (1869), (1852), 7 Exch. 691 L. E. 4 C. P. 744 Campanari v. Woodhurn (1854), 15 C. B. 400 Houstoun v. Bohertson (1816), 6 Taunt. 448 Cottle v. Aldrich (1815), 4 M. & S. 175 Phillips V. Jo7ies (1888), 4 T. L. E. 401 Be Overtueg, Haas v. Durant, [1900] 1 Ch. 209 ; Graham v. Jackson (1845), 6 Q. B. 811 Bailey v. Collett (1854), 18 Beav. 179; OoodsonY. Alexander (1837), 1 Jur. 37; Watson v. King (1815), 1 Stark. 121 (even if the authorit}^ is coupled with an interest) but see Spooner v. Sandilands (1842), 1 Y. & C. Ch. 390; and see Carter v. White (1883), 25 Ch. D. 666
V.
between authority and contract). (m) Preiu v. Nmin (1879), 4 Q,. B. D. 661. But a lunatic's estate may be liable for necessaries. See Be Weaver (1882) 21 Ch. D. 615. (n) Foster v. Bates (1843), 12 M. & W. 226 Campanari v. Woodhurn, supra. (o) Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Yict. c. 41), s. 47. Duke of Beaufort (V) Fx parte Bradbury, Be Waldeu (1839), Mont. & C. 625 V. Glynn (1855), 1 Jur. 888. The principal (q) Drew V. Nunn, supra ; Piatt v. Depree (1893), 9 T. L. E. 194. excused the representatives of the purchaser, who had become insane agent held entitled to commission. (distinction
