Part YIII.
— Cruelty
to Animals.
411
Nor can dubbing or cutting off the combs of cocks, which causes them pain, be justified for the purpose of exhibiting them or for
Sect.
On the other hand, the spaying of sows, which ((/). make them more useful for food, was held not to be Act merely because it caused pain (e). An intention to
Oftences.
cockfighting
was
said to
within the
commit
].
General
comb^ cutting,
cruelty is not an essential part of the offence the question each case being whether there was in fact cruelty to the animal {/).
in
881. Guilty knowledge is an essential, and must be proved, Mensrea. otherwise the accused cannot be said to have caused or procured the cruelty {g). It is not sufficient to show that a defendant would have known of the suffering of the animal had he properly performed his duties. The mere fact that it is the duty of a man in the position of a manager to see that horses are fit to be worked does not render him liable to be convicted when they are worked in an unfit state, without proof of his knowledge of the actual Where the defendant visited cattle and failed to cruelty {h). loosen their head-ropes after disembarkation, and one was found suffering from a bad wound, the conviction was quashed in the absence of proof of his knowledge of the animal's suffering (/). Where a veterinary surgeon certified a mare as free from pain and fit for work, and the magistrate found that he knowingly counselled the owner to cause the act of cruelty, but that such advice was not the proximate cause of the cruelty, and acquitted him, the Court remitted the case for conviction on the ground that he was a principal offender {k) under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 {I).
A
mere omission to alleviate suffering is not an act of meaning of the statute {m) thus it is no offence merely not to kill an animal in pain {n) it is inhuman cruelty not to kill it, but passive cruelty of that kind is not an offence 882.
cruelty within the
under the Act
(o).
dishorning cattle when performed with skill and in the usual manner for the purpose of preventing inj ury is not an offence. See Renton v. TFy7so?i (1888), 15 Ct. Sess., 4th series, Just. Cas. 84, followed in TodricJc v. Wilson (1891), 2 White, Just. Cas. 636, and B. v. McDonagh (1891), 28 L. E. Ir. 204. Ford v. Wiley is, however, binding on justices in England and Wales. (d) MurpJuj V. Manning (1877). 2 Ex. D. 307. (e) Lewis v. Fermor (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 532; dissented from in Ford v. Wileij (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 203, see note (c), supra. (/) Duncan v. Pope (1899), 63 J. P. 217 (killing a dog). {g) A lion tamer was convicted where a pony was attacked by one of the performing lions, but the Court was careful not to lay down a general rule that it is an offence to put a domestic animal with a tamed beast. There must be some evidence of mens rea {Thielbar v. Craigen (1905), 69 J. P. 421). (/i) Small V. Warr Compare Greemuood v. Backhouse (1883), 47 J. P. 20. (1902j, 86 L. T. 566. (?) Elliott V. Oshorn (1891), 65 L. T. 378. (k) Benford v. Sims, [1898] 2 Q,. B. 641. This decision proceeded upon the very special findings in the case, and is not an authority for holding that every veterinary surgeon who gives a wrong opinion is liable to be convicted if cruelty in fact results (/)er Channell, J., at p. 646). il) 11 & 12 Yict. c. 43 (Jer vis's Act), s. 5. (m) Westbrook v. Field (1887), 51 J. P. 726 (n) Everitt v. Bavics (1878), 38 L. T. 361. (o)
Per CoCKBURN,
C.J., Powell v.
compare
Elliott v. Oshorn, supra,
Knight (1878), 38 L. T. 607, at
p.
608
Omission to alleviate
^rmg.
