recounts, Harris was granted habeas relief, and his sentence was vacated in 2016, prior to passage of the FSMA. If his resentencing had been completed prior to passage of the Act, he would have been entitled to the same sentencing relief as Jackson. In Gordon, we held that the holding in Miller would be applied retroactively in Arkansas. We did so on the basis that fundamental fairness required that prisoners similarly situated to Jackson receive the same relief to which he was entitled as a successful petitioner to the Supreme Court of the United States. Under Gordon, Harris was entitled to the same habeas relief as Jackson, and he would have been subject to the same punishment range on resentencing but for the timing in the trial court. For the reasons of fundamental fairness and evenhanded justice that drove our decision in Gordon, I believe Harris should receive the same remedy that was applied in Jackson.
For these reasons, I concur.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. The Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 ("FSMA") was thoughtfully designed by the General Assembly to address, in two ways, the constitutional questions regarding the sentencing of convicted murderers who committed their crimes while they were still minors. First, it responded to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Miller vs. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery vs. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). Second, it amended the sentencing statute for juvenile offenders committing capital murder or first-degree murder.
The decision in Miller left the Arkansas sentencing statute constitutionally defective as it pertained to the sentences of those who committed capital or first-degree murder as
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