that remain[ed] [was] that capital murder is a Class Y felony." Id., at 7–8, 426 S.W.3d at 910. We remanded the case for a sentencing hearing at which Jackson could present Miller evidence for consideration and instructed that Jackson's sentence must fall within the discretionary sentencing range for a Class Y felony, which is ten to forty years or life. Id. at 9, 426 S.W.3d at 911 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997)); see also Whiteside v. State, 2013 Ark. 176, 426 S.W.3d 917 (reversing juvenile offender's capital-murder sentence and remanding to the circuit court for resentencing within the discretionary statutory-sentencing range for a Class Y felony and directing that a sentencing hearing be held for presentation and consideration of Miller evidence).
After Jackson obtained relief, other "Miller defendants" sought resentencing. The State took the position that Miller did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. We disagreed, and in Kelley v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, 465 S.W.3d 842, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1378 (2016), we held that, as a matter of "fundamental fairness and evenhanded justice," Miller applied to all juvenile offenders convicted of capital murder. Id. at 7, 465 S.W.3d at 846. In doing so, we stated that Gordon was entitled to the same relief from his unconstitutional sentence as Jackson received—namely, a sentencing proceeding at which he will have the opportunity to present Miller evidence. Id., 465 S.W.3d at 846. Consequently, we affirmed the circuit court's order vacating Gordon's life-without-parole sentence and reinvesting the sentencing court with jurisdiction to hold a new sentencing hearing under Miller. Id., 465 S.W.3d at 846.
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