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RECENT CASES. 129 that no vested rights are thereby impaired " ; and under the doctrine of the principal case a power to consolidate, while unexecuted, is not a vested right. The decision seems in line with the tendency to limit the scope of the Dartmouth College Case, and to give wider range to the so-called police power of the State legislatures. Contracts — Compromise of Doubtful Ci^mu. — Held, that a promise made in consideration of the release by the promisee of a doubtful claim against the promisor is valid, though such claim was not in fact enforceable. Dovale v. Ackermann, jj N. Y", Supp. 959. It has been held that the release of a doubtful claim is not sufficient consideration to support a promise, where no valid claim actually existed in favor of the promisee. Gtnining v. Royal, 59 Miss. 45. Such a rule as this would apparently discourage com- promise, as each case would be decided in court the same after compromise as before. A better doctrine is supported by the weight of authority, both in England and the United States. According to this modern view, the compromise of a doubtful claim is valid consideration, if the promisee honestly believed that he had a good cause of action. Cook v. Wright, i B. & S. 559; Zoebisch v. Von Minden et al., 120 N. Y. 406; Pollock on Contracts, 2d Am. ed., 182, note (/), collecting authorities. It will be ob- served that the court, in deciding DovaJe v. Ackermann, did not directly pass upon the question whether it was necessary that the plaintiff should have honestly believed she had a valid claim; but that she did have such belief appears quite clear upon the facts. Contracts — Consideration. — Held, that a note without other consideration than the giving up of what afterwards turned out to be a useless certificate of registra- tion, is invalid for want of consideration. McCullutn v. Edmonds, 19 So. Rep. coi (Ala.). In the absence of all fraud, and as a question of law, this decision is contra to the weight of authority. Whatever might have been the ruling in equity, the mere inade- quacy of consideration, so long as there was some consideration, should not have been gone into by a court of law. The plaintiff was not bound to turn over the certificate, and the mere fact that it was not so valuable as the defendant expected should have no bearing on the case. Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & E. 309, cited with approval in Wilton v. Eaton, 127 Mass. 174. See 2lso Judy v. Loiiderman, 29 N. E. Rep. 181 (Ohio), and Churchill v. Bradley, 5 Atl. Rep. 189 (Vt.). Criminal Law — Homicide — Self-defence. — Where one attempted to pass over the land of another, without legal right and at all hazards, and the owner intended to prevent such trespass at all hazards, held, that the one attempting to pass without legal right is entitled to take the life of the other in self-defence, he himself having been guilty of no overt act in bringing on the affray. People v. Con/cling, 44 Pac. Rep. 314 (Cal.). This decision, although in accord with recent adjudications by the same court cited in the opinion, does not represent the better law. The court seems to put much stress on the generally accepted rule in Stofferv. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, that when a person has been feloniously assailed, and the felon has desisted from his attempt and taken to flight, the right to pursue for private defence ceases as soon as, in the reasonable belief of the assailed, the danger has ceased to be immediate and impending. There is no analogy between the cases. In Stoffer v. State the original felonious attack had ceased completely. A reopening of the assault was an entirely new offence, which the deceased undertook at his own risk. But in the principal case the facts seem to be totally dif- ferent. The trespass was one of a series of continuous acts, which, as was known to the defendant, would in all probability lead up to the taking of life. Criminal Law — Intoxicating Liquor — Sale by Social Club. — i¥rA/, that the dispensing of liquors by a social club, which has a limited membership, and was organized for a legitimate purpose, to which the furnishing of liquors to its members is merely incidental, is not a sale within the meaning of the liquor law of 1892. People V. Adelphi Club, 43 N. E. Rep. 410 (N. Y.). See Notes. Damages — Contract — Duty to Mitigate. — In an action for refusal to allow the completion of a contract to haul logs, it was contended that damages should be reduced by proceeds obtainable from other employment during the time necessary to have completed the contract. Held, that where the breach is of a contract to do a particular thing not necessarily involving personal services, there is no duty to seek to mitigate damages for the benefit of the delinquent, and if the plaintiff actually does ob- tain employment the amount of damages is not thereby affected. Sullivan v. McMillan, 19 So. Rep. 340 (Fla.). The case seems to represent the American law. The distinction is taken on account of the impracticability of going into evidence of what the plaintiff might have earned