Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/158

132 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. would seem that, unless the court has the children before it, it has no right to make a decree; for it is the children's interests which must be primarily considered, and this can only be done when the infants are present and adequately represented. See note to Flint River Stea?nboat Co. v, Foster, 48 Am. Dec. 273, and Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 499. Persons — Married Women — Dedication by Estoppel. — In consequence of an agreement with the respondent, a married woman, that she would dedicate part of her land to the public, the complainant, an adjoining proprietor, erected a building on the site of the proposed street. By a statute, a married woman could not convey without joining her husband. Held, that a dedication could not be established against the respondent by an estoppel in pais. Such dedication must be accomplished by con- forming to the statutory requirements, or by a proper conveyance in which her husband is joined. Vansandt v. Weir, 19 So. Rep. 424 (Ala.). This case is undoubtedly correct {Todd v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne <Sr» Chicago R. R., 19 Ohio St. 514) ; but there being no misrepresentations, it is hard to see how any question of estoppel arose. Generally speaking, however, where there is no question of tort, a married woman cannot be deprived by estoppel of that which she can- not deprive herself of by her own free will. 2 Bishop on Married Women, Chapter XXXVI. In Angell on Highways, 3d ed.. Chap. III., § 156, the view that there may be dedica- tion by estoppel in pais is repudiated, and it would seem with justice. Because a man is estopped by his acts or representations from denying the existence of a way as to three or four persons, it does not follow that he has dedicated this way to the public as a street. Persons — Married Women — Power to Bind Separate Estate. — A mar- ried woman mortgaged her land as security for a loan to her husband. She made no representations at the time of the mortgage that the loan had any connection with her separate estate, and the mortgagee knew in fact that the loan was for the husband's sole benefit. A statute gave the married woman the right ** to contract and be con- tracted with as to her separate property in the same manner as if she were unmarried." Held, this mortgage was unenforceable, because not connected in any way with the mar- ried woman's separate estate. If she had represented that it was such a contract, she would have been estopped from setting up her incapacity. American Mortgage Co. v. Owens, 72 Fed. Rep. 219. Statutes in terms like the one in this case are common, and the result here reached is in accord with authority generally. Property — Adverse Possession, — The plaintiff had a remainder in fee in certain land, one Brown being her guardian. This same Brown was the life tenant on whose estate the remainder was expectant. In hjs capacity of guardian, apparently in ignorance of his own life estate, he attempted to convey by deed a present fee to a third party, which deed now turns out to be void for non-compliance with requisite for- malities. The grantee under this deed took possession, and by several mesne convey- ances the land came into possession of the defendant, who has occupied it for the period required by statute to bar actions. Brown, the life tenant, died, whereupon the plain- tiff brought this ejectment. Held, that, notwithstanding the outstanding life estate, the statute had run against the plaintiff. Nelson v. Davidson, 43 N. E. Rep. 361 (111.). The court lays some stress on the fact that the deed which gave color to the de- fendant's adverse possession purported to convey the plaintiff's estate, but nothing would seem to turn on that. If Brown cannot be considered a party to the disseisin, no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff, and she cannot be barred. If the other view is taken, and the plaintiff's estate is being infringed upon, then this decision is a distinct rejection of the doctrine of disseisin by election laid down in Taylor d. Aikyus V. Horde, i Burr. 60, and followed by the later decisions ; 4 Kent's Commentaries, §§ 482 et seq. Property — Landlord and Tenant — Surrender by Operation of Law. — Held, that, where the lessee of a wharf abandoned it, the collection of wharfage by the lessor from a shipper who occasionally used the wharf during the remainder of the term did not operate as a surrender, as such user was not procured by the lessor. Aberdeen Coal &> Mining Co, v. City of Evansville, 43 N. E. Rep. 316 (Ind.). The court does not dispute the existence of a surrender where the lessor creates a new tenancy after abandonment by the lessee. Thomas v. Cook, 2 B. & Aid. 119, is cited with approval. But, it is said, the collection of wharfage from one who uses the wharf at his own instance merely, does not operate to discharge the lessee from liability to pay rent. It is to be noticed that the doctrine of Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. St. 370, (in which case the landlord re-rented the abandoned premises, to mitigate the lessee's damages, and