Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/333

NOTES. 307 out the true rule, if there is one. When a plaintiff comes into court and shows that he has suffered such damage as the law will recognize, and that the defendant's conduct has failed to come up to the standard required by law, the point in issue is simply. Did the defendant do this? It is certainly possible to contend that the average juror might better be trusted to work out justice in answering the question thus stated accord- ing to the dictates of common sense, than in applying a complicated rule of law, however elaborately it be explained. If, however, a rule can be phrased which will embody the real intent and meaning of this simple question, and will do nothing more, such rule will have the decisive advan- tage of precision. The effort to find a more definite form in which to leave the issue to the jury, then, is certainly worth while. It is suggested that the solution was reached when the idea of looking at the chain of events from the after " point of view was conceived. Wardlaw, J., in Harrison v. Berkley, i Strob. 525 ; Earl, J., in Ehrgott v. Mayor of New York, 96 N. Y. 280 ; Smith v. Lofidon 6- Southwestern Ey. Co., 6 Com. PI. 14. If it appear that in fact nothing which could be an effi- cient cause has intervened between the act complained of and the ensuing harm, the causal connection between the two would seem to be sufficiently established. In such a case, the fact that the result was one not reasonably to have been foreseen, or not found likely to occur on calculation of chances, would certainly not make the defendant's act any less the cause. The fact that the consequence was probable is important in that such probability determines, in a measure, the character of the defendant's act. That is, the occurrence of an injury which was or should have been foreseen would appear to be a natural and proximate result, even though circumstances intervened which would break the causal connection had the result not been contemplated. (Lord Wens- leydale in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577.) The Supreme Court ot Canada in laying down the natural and proximate rule adopted the proper definite form of leaving with the jury the question, Did the defendant do this wrong? Constitutionality of Bi-Partisan Police Commission Law. — A few months ago the legislature of New York passed a statute providing for the appointment of four police commissioners by the Common Council of Albany. It was stipulated that no person should be eligible for the office who was not a member of one of the two leading political parties in the Common Council, and that not more than two of the commissioners should be elected from either party. The opponents of the statute were not slow to assert that the State legislature had no power to prescribe any such qualifications for municipal officers ; that the statute was an unwarrantable interference with the right of local self-government ; and that, even apart from this, the statute was unconstitutional as arbitrarily rendering ineligible for the office the class of citizens who belong to neither of the leading political parties. The Court of Appeals, in Rathbone v. IVirth, 45 N. E. Rep. 15, has recently sustained these contentions. The opinion of Gray, J., embodies a valiant defence of the right of municipal home rule against the slightest encroachments. The learned judge speaks of the question as one "of surpassing importance to the citizens of the State," and deals with it throughout in a very statesmanlike manner. He main- tains that under the article of the State constitution which provides that municipal officers shall be elected by the inhabitants of the municipality, or