Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/153

NOTES. 133 The suggestion at once presents itself that a trustee who has com- mitted a breach of trust should not be permitted to recover the property, but that the grantee with notice be made a constructive trustee for the original cestui que trust, until a new trustee be appointed by the court. It is often said in decisions that the trustee files the bill solely in his representative capacity ; but was it not in his representative capacity that he committed the breach of trust? " It is the duty of the trustee to repair his breach of trust ; " yes, if the cestui files a bill against him for compensa- tion ; but does not justice demand in protection of the cestui that adminis- tration of the trust cannot be claimed as of right by one who has proved himself incapable of administration, and that the property be put into safer and more worthy hands? It is true that if the grantee give back the prop- erty to the original trustee the latter's duties revive ; but this is very differ- ent from saying that such a wrongdoer may of right demand administration again. And if on the view of holding the grantee with notice a constructive trustee for the original cestui, the grantee would be liable for giving back the property to the original trustee, such a logical result does not seem too harsh. It may be futile, however, at the present date to deny that the wrongful trustee has a locus pcenitenticc, and by a bill in equity may get back the trust property, which doctrine seems now well settled by authority. I Vet more v. Porter, 92 N. Y. 76. If the view above taken were accepted, the principle advocated in Wdlson V. Louisville Trust Co. could not stand, for the original trustee simply dropping out, the statute would not run in favor of the constructive trustee while the cestuis were under disabilities. But even if Wetmore v. Porter be supported, it is still difficult to follow the reasoning of the Ken- tucky case on this point. The action which the original trustee would bring to recover the trust-res being in equity, even if the statutory period has run equity will not follow the analogy of the statute where it would work manifest injustice. It is questionable, then, if, in this case, equity should bar the cestui que trusts who were young infants or not yet born when the wrongful conveyance was made. Spontaneous Combustion in Marine Insurance. — There have been few decided cases on the question of recovery on a marine insurance policy against fire and the perils of the sea for loss by spontaneous com- bustion. It seems to be well settled, however, that in such case the owner of the goods insured is barred the recovery of his insurance on the principle that spontaneous combustion is caused by an "inherent vice " in the goods themselves, not by any peril of the sea, and is there- fore not within the terms of the policy. Providence Washington Ins. Co. V. Adler, 65 Md. 162. But if the owner of the goods is thus precluded from recovery, will the same principle of inherent vice prevent the owner of the vessel from recovering insurance on his freight which he has lost through spontaneous combustion, or a necessary discharge of the goods to prevent such disaster? This question was presented for the first time, it seems, in the recent English case of The Knight of St. Michael, [1898] P. 30. When half way through the voyage a part of the cargo of coal on the vessel became so heated as to cause imminent danger of spontane- ous combustion, and the captain was obl'ged to discharge a portion of the cargo at an intermediate port. In an action by the owner of the vessel for the insurance on the freight thus lost to him, the court gave