Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/162

142 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Insurance. — Accidental Cause of Death. — Held, that where blood poison- ing results from an abrasion of the skin of a toe by a new shoe, and death follows, the death is properly attributable to " bodily injuries effected by external, violent, and accidental means," within the meaning of an accident policy. Western Commercial Travellers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. Rep. 401 (C. C. A., Eighth Cir.). The decision turns upon the meaning given to the vvford " accidental." While the authorities clearly show that the word "accident" in an insurance policy is given a different signification from that in which it is commonly used, no entirely satisfactory definition of an accident has yet been found. A number of the better definitions are collected in Lovelace -v. Travellers etc. Ass'n, 126 Mo. 104. Perhaps the most definite conclusion that can be gathered from the decisions is that an injury is accidental when produced by some unforeseen, unintended, and violent agency. A case which naturally invites comparison with the principal one is Baron v. U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n, 123 N. Y. 304, where it was held that death resulting from a malignant pustule, caused by contact with diseased animal matter, was not accidental. The finding of the court that the pustule was a disease, excludes the idea of a violent agency, and seems to be suffi- cient to distinguish the cases. Legal Tender — Mutilated Note. — The plaintiff presented in payment of car fare a note, from the corner of which a piece about an inch square had been torn. The conductor refused the mutilated note and, upon the refusal of the plaintiff to make further payment, ejected him from the car. Held, that the railroad company is not lia- ble in an action for damages for the ejection. North Hudson County K. R. v. Anderson, 39 Atl. Rep. 905 (N. J., C. A.). The case rests on the ground that while a mutilated note may, by the rules of the Treasury Department, be redeemable, the holder of such a note cannot cast upon one, unwilling to assume it, the burden of applying for its redemption. This is a sensible decision, and is distinguishable from the case of New Jersey, etc. R. R. Co. v. Mor^^an, 52 N. J. Law, 60, which was relied upon by the plaintiff. In that case a coin consider- ably worn, but still distinguishable as a coin which had been issued from the mint, was held to be a legal tender. The cases may be distinguished on the ground that the coin presented all the indicia of money, while the mutilated note did not. Marine Insurance— Spontaneous Combustion. — Held, that an owner of a vessel cannot recover insurance on his freight against loss by fire and perils of the sea, when the captain of the vessel was obliged to discharge part of the cargo of coal be- cause of imminent danger of spontaneous combustion. The Knight of St. Michael, [1898] P. 30. See Notes. Persons — Guardian de son Tort — Purchase of Ward's Land. — One who, without legal appointment, assumed to act as a guardian to a person non compos mentis, purchased at a tax sale land belonging to the ward. Held, that he acquired no bene- ficial interest therein. Town of Thornton v. Gilvian, 39 Atl. Rep. 900 (N. H.). The case falls within the principle that whoever assumes to act as a fiduciary incurs all of the burdens and incapacities pertaining to a de jure occupant of the position. Perry, Trusts, § 245 ; Schouler, Domestic Relations, § 326. The application of this doctrine to guardians is well recognized, although cases upon the point are rare enough to be interesting. A more familiar instance is that of the executor de son tort. Of course, a guardian legally appointed would not be allowed to compete with the interests of the ward by purchasing the latter'sjand at a tax sale. The present decision, there- fore, follows inevitably from the general principle as above stated. Persons — Married Women — Alienation of Husband's Affections. — Held, where by statute a married woman is given the right to bring actions in her own name, she may maintain an action against one who wrongfully induces her husband to leave her. Gererdv. Gererd, 39 Atl. Rep. 884 (Del.). The case affords a striking illustration of the way in which the harsh and unreason- able rule of the common law relating to married women has been swept away by courts and legislatures. A different decision, however, has been reached in several of the jurisdictions where the tendency in general is to place a strict construction upon the statutes enlarging the rights of married women. Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374. The more reasonable view and that supported by the great weight of authority, is in accord with the principal case. Cooley, Torts, 2d ed. 228. The injury resulting from the alienation of affections is the same whether it affects the husband or the wife, and all that stood between the wife and her right of action at common law was the legal fiction that the husband and wife are one. Where a statute removes the disability which is founded upon this fiction, there seems to be no satisfactory reason against allowing the action.