Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/279

THE DECEPTIVE USE OF ONE'S OWN NAME. 259 the firm and took part in carrying on the business the court de- clined to grant an injunction against the use of the name Louis Roederer & Co. , but required that the full first name should be used in all cases and also that the words " house founded in 1864" should be added. In Society Th6r6se Picon et Comp. v. Picon et Comp.^ it ap- peared that the bitters made by Gaetan Picon had acquired a great reputation and become generally known as " Picon Bitters " but sometimes as " African Bitters." Th6r^se Picon, a daughter of Gaetan, and her partner undertook to sell bitters under the name of " Therese Picon & Company " in competition with the pro- prietors of her father's business. An injunction was granted pro- hibiting the defendants from using, either as a mark or in any way in the business of making or selling bitters, the names " Bitters of the daughter Picon " or " Bitters of Th6rese Picon," or " African Bitters " or even " Bitters " alone and requiring them to use " Bitters " followed by some qualification or adjective with the statement underneath " made by Therese Picon & Co. House founded in 1888." It was further ordered that the letters in which the words "Bitters" and its qualification were printed should be twice as large as those used for the statement " Made by Therese Picon & Co." and that the word " Th^r^se " should be printed in letters of the same size and color as the " Picon." The details covered by this decree are all of importance, espe- cially the efforts to guard against the defendant's goods being known as " Picon Bitters " by requiring the use of some adjective that may become the short trade name of their product and by prescribing a style of printing calculated to produce this effect. These provisions show what the defendant ought to do in order to properly comply with the forms of injunction in use in the American and English courts, which require him in general terms to plainly distinguish his goods from the plaintiff's, and the result should be substantially the same in case proceedings for contempt have to be taken. It is to be observed that the plaintiff's right to be protected against loss and injury to his trade caused by deception, so far as this protection can be afforded without unreasonably restricting trade, does not depend on any intentional fraud or bad motive of the defendant. 1 Dalloz, Recueil Periodique de Jurisprudence G^nerale, 1894 i, page 348 (Cour de Cassation). 34