Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/367

NOTES. 347 a fisherman taking possession the next moment thereby had the title. Large amounts of capital are to-day invested in wild animals imported for exhibition, and grave injustice may some time arise from a strict ap- plication of the ancient rule. The Parol Evidence Rule Again. — The following communication contains additional facts regarding the case of In Re Root^s Estate, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision of the Orphans' Court on the ground that it was error to admit evidence of the testator's intention. " By way of supplement to the note in the November number of the Review (p. 210), on 'The Parol Evidence Rule as Applied to Wills,' it may be added that in the case commented on (Root's Estate, 40 Atl. Rep. 818; s. c. 187 Pa., 118), the Court ignores, and the report fails to men- tion, the fact that the will itself, as will be seen from the following extract, shows that the testator spoke of his wife's nephews as * my nephews ' : — * And . . . after the decease of my said dear wife, I do give . . . : Unto my wife's cousin, M. L. Greer, . . . $6000 ; unto my nephew, Wil- liam Root, . . . $1000; unto my nephew, George Clayton, . . . $1000; unto my wife's sister, Sarah Root, . . . $1000; unto my nephew, Henry Sheppard, . . . $1000; unto my nephew, John Sheppard, . . . $1000.' " Of the persons thus described as * my nephews,' George Clayton was his nephew, while Henry Slieppard and John Sheppard were, admittedly, the nephews of his wife : whether, therefore, the * William Root ' intended was actually his nephew of that name, or the William who was his nephew only in the sense in which the two Sheppards were, was the question ; and in the court below, the matter having, under exceptions to the original adjudication, been referred back to the Auditing Judge for inquiry upon this point (Legal Intelligencer, February 5th, 1897, 6 District Rep., 78), it was found from the evidence that of the two persons to whom, in the sense indicated by the will, the language was equally applicable, William Root, the wife's nephew, was the one intended, and the legacy was accord- ingly awarded to him." These facts show an unusual combination of circumstances. Had there been two true nephews named William Root it has long been settled law that the testator's declarations of intention would be admitted. This would be a case where, in the dictionary meaning of the words, the will applies exactly to two persons. The principal case differs in that one of the William Roots was a wife's nephew, and that the dictionary meaning of the words would point to but one of the William Roots and exclude the other. But when the entire will is examined — as it undoubtedly may be in such a case — it appears that the testator was not using the term " my nephew " in its strict dictionary sense, but indiscriminately, as meaning either " my nephew," or " my wife's nephew." That is, if the will is used as a dictionary and the testator is made his own interpreter, it appears that he attached a meaning to the phrase " my nephew " which was equally applicable to either William Root, and that, accordingly, there were here two persons who in the light of the whole instrument exactly filled the description. Whether there is sufficient difference between this case and the case of two real nephews of the same name to warrant the exclusion here of the declarations of intention is a question which, until the present case, has apparently never come before a court. It is accordingly the 45