Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/373

RECENT CASES. 353 Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce — Pouce Power. — Defendant p irchased liquor in North Carolina and proceeded to transport it in a buggy to his h );ne in South Carolina. He was arrested in the latter state and convicted under a statute which provided that any person handling and hauling contraband liquors in the night-time should be guilty of a misdemeanor. Held, that such statute is not unconsti- tutional, as permitting an mterference with interstate commerce. State v. Holleynian, 31 S. E. Rep. 362 (.S. C). The decision is by an evenly divided court. It is contended by one of the judges who upheld the conviction that although there is an interference with an interstate com- merce transaction, yet it is permitted by the "Wilson Bill." This, however, seems unsound. By the provisions of that act, each State is given the power to make laws affecting goods upon their arrival within the state, and the opinion of the dissenting judges that such goods are not subjected to state laws until they reach the consignee at their destination seems to be in consonance with the construction of the United States Supreme Court. Rhodes v. loioa, 170 U. S. 412, 420. Still, the case may be supported upon the view taken by another of the judges, namely, that defendant was not engaged in an interstate commerce transaction. It would scarcely be contended that a person who is travelling home with a suit of clothes which he has purchased in a neighboring state, could claim to be engaged in interstate commerce, and the position of the present defendant is strictly analogous. It is conceded that the statute in ques- tion is a valid exercise of the police power. Constitutional Law — Sidewalk Ordinance — Removal of Snow. — A city ordinance required every occupant or owner of property to keep the snow removed from the sidewalk adjoining his premises. Held, that such an ordinance is uncon- stitutional since it imposes unequal burdens, and is equivalent to unequal taxation and to a taking of property without due process of law. State v. Jackman, 41 All. Rep. 347 (N. H.). The case well illustrates the petty views of the scope of the great constitutional guarantees here invoked, which some courts insist on holding and applying with such mistaken zeal. The decision is supported by Gridley v. Bloommgton, 88 111. 554, and by Chicago v. O'Brien, iii 111. 532, but it is nevertheless erroneous. The ordinance is an eminently fair and just one, not at all arbitrary or oppressive. It provides an equitable method of apportioning the burden of a public duty among the class of citizens most interested in its performance, and so situated as to be able most conveniently to attend to it. See contra to the principal case, Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268; Reinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind. 382. The reasoning of Shaw, C. J., in the first of these cases, seems unanswerable. There is really no taking of prop- erty, no taxation. The regulation is simi>ly an exercise of ordinary police powers. Constitutional Law — Taxation — Patents. — In taxing the capital stock of a corporation, patent rights owned by the company were included. Held, that this was error, for patent rights are not subject to State taxation. People v. Board of Assessors, 51 N. E. Rep. 269 (N. Y.). A state law taxing shares of stock in a corporation provided that the value of the shares should be determined by making certain deductions from the aggregate value of the capital stock and dividing the residuum by the number of shares. Held, that patent rights owned by the company can be included in assessing the aggregate value of the capital stock. Crown Cork &> Seal Co. v. State, 40 Atl. Rep. 1074 (Md.). The latter case contains a dictum to the effect that patent rights are directly taxable by the State, but the opinion of the New York court upon this question seems quite correct. It may be conceded that a tax on patent rights is not levied upon the agencies of the Federal government within the rule in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, and it is undoubtedly true that the patented articles are completely subject to State legislation. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 507. Yet, the principle of the supremacy of Federal laws within their constitutional sphere requires that the incorporeal right to exclude others from using the invention, being derived from the laws of the United States, should not be abridged by State taxation. To this effect is the weight of authority. In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. Rep. 833. But see People v Campbell, I38"N. Y. 543. 547- In the Maryland case, however, the tax was laid not on the capital stock but on the shares thereof. This distinction is technical but sound, and is established by authority. 2 Cook, Corporations, 4th ed., §§ 561, 563, 568. Consequently, admitting that capital stock consisting of patent rights is non-taxable, the shares should not be included in the exemption. Cf. Shelby Co. v. Union, dr'c. Bank, 161 U. S. 149. It is, apparently, immaterial that non-taxable property is taken into consideration in reckoning the amount of a tax on legitimate subjects. Society for Savings v. Coite. 6 Wall. 594. Therefore, the recent decisions in New York and Maryland are reconcilable, and both are in accordance with principle.