Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/450

430 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. By reason of this clause, a citizen of Ohio had his claim postponed; and the court holds that he has been deprived of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in violation of Article IV., section 2, of the United States Con- stitution. Blake v. McClung, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. The first step that had to be taken in reaching this conclusion was to hold that the preferred class of persons, "residents of Tennessee," comprised in reality "citizens of Tennessee"; otherwise there could be no discrimination against citi- zens of other States, qua citizens. Yet this step is difficult to take in view of the principle that of two constructions a statute should be given the one which keeps it Vvdthin the limits of the constitution; and it would seem that the majority of the court, who thought the statute invalid if it discriminated against citizens of other States, should have given it the more literal construction unless as so construed it would be hopelessly unreasonable. Cf. Holmes, J., in Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117. And hopelessly unreasonable a discrimination is not, Vv'hich favors residents of the State without reference to citizenship. A greater reason, in fact, might be thought to exist for a legislature's giving protection to all those residing within its jurisdiction than for protecting those residents and non-residents who happened to be citizens of the State. The taking of this difficult step, however, does not leave the present decision free from doubt; and there is great force in the dissent of Mr. Justfce Brewer, in which the Chief Justice concurred. When the State granted the foreign company the favor of incorporation, it could exact certain securities for the protection of its own citizens. For their sole benefit the State might have required pledges. This is admitted by the majority of the court, and in admitting it they seem to admit the whole case. For if the corporation might be required to pledge some of its property, the property pledged might amount to all that the corporation owned within the State. If the legislature could compel this, why should it require the formalities of a pledge or a mortgage? A mortgage con- sists in acts by the parties to which the law attaches legal consequences; but the legislature has power to enact these legal consequences without prior acts by the parties. That was in effect done in the principal case; certain persons were given a claim to property without the formalities of a mortgage or deposit as security; but the legal consequences are much alike in either case and the attempt made in the majority opinion to dis- tinguish the two is not convincing. So far as justice to foreign dealers is concerned, the incumbrance by statute is as fair as that by act of the parties; a statute on the books is quite as obvious as a record in the registry of deeds. Granted then that the statute protected citizens of Tennessee as such, it is hard to see what deprivation of privileges and immunities was inflicted on the citizens of other States. RECENT CASES. Admiralty — Jurisdiction — Personal Injuries. — A ladder attached to the side of a ship was negligently left in an unsecure condition. The libellant, in attempt- ing to leave the ship by means of the ladder, was thrown upon a wharf and injured. Held, that a Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction of libellant's claim for damages. The Strabo, 90 Fed. Rep. no (Dist. Ct., N. Y.). Not only is this decision sound, but the true principle upon which these jurisdiclional questions depend is well stated. There is much confusion of statement in the cases as