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RECENT CASES. 437 public interest that the courts have looked with favor on the claims of those furnishing material or labor necessary for its operation. When, therefore, courts of equity have exercised their jurisdiction in the appointment of a receiver, they have recognized the right to priority of the "current supply claimant." The case is one of conflicting equities, and the principle laid down is, that the net income, to which the lien of the mortgagee attaches, is subject to an equitable charge in favor of claims, coming under the head of current indebtedness, which have accrued before the appointment of the receiver. Hale v. Frost, 99 U. S. 389; Burnham v. Bowen, iii U. S. 776; Virginia, etc. Co. V. Central, etc. Co. of Georgia, 170 U. S. 355. The same considerations which have influenced the courts in applying this doctrine to railroad companies justify the hold- ing of the principal case in applying it to telegraph companies. Sales — Bill of Lading — • Passing of Title. — While goods were in transitu the consignor sold them and drew on the buyer. He deposited the draft with the payee bank, together with the bill of lading indorsed to the buyer conditionally upon payment of the draft. The buyer paid the draft and received the bill of lading without notice of an intervening attachment of the goods as the consignor's property. Held, that the attachment was good. Kentucky Refining Co. v. Globe Refining Co., 47 S. W. Rep. 602 (Ky.). The court erroneously treats property and jus disponendi as necessarily synonymous. See Lord Cairns in Ogg v. Shuter, 1 C. P. D. 47; Lord Bramwell in Mirahita v. Bank, 3 Ex. D. 164. The time when title passes depends upon the intention of the parties as shown by all the facts. Benjamin, Sales, 4th Am. ed., § 308, et seq. It would seem better here to hold that title passed at the time of the contract of sale, since the goods were specific and ready for delivery, and the bill of lading already made out. The later dealing with the bill of lading shows only an intention by the seller to retain a jus dis- ponendi, a power of controlling the possession of the carrier to secure payment of the purchase money. See above cases. This would make the attachment void. See Peters v. Elliott, 78 111. 321, where on similar facts this result is reached on the more prevalent American view that a bill of lading represents title. The dealing with the bill of lading is treated like a mortgage to the vendee to secure future advances, the vendee's title to the goods, acquired by payment of the draft, relating back to the time of the deposit of the bill of lading with the bank. Sales — Stoppage in Transitu — Bona Fide Purchaser. — A sold goods to B, who resold them to C in part payment of a pre-existing debt. A shipped them to C, deliverable to C's order by the bill of lading, which was sent to B. Before it was transferred to C and before the goods were delivered, B became insolvent. Held, that A could not stop the goods. Shepard &* Morse Lumber Co. v. Burroughs, 41 Atl. Rep. 695 (xN. J., Sup. Ct.). The court held that the transitus was not at an end, but that the delivery by A to B of a bill of lading drawn in the name of C was a delivery for C's benefit, and was as good as a delivery to C himself, and, lastly, that the satisfaction of a pre-existing debt is sufficient consideration for the transfer of a bill of lading to cut off the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu. On the first point the court is undoubtedly right. Bethell V. Clark, 20 Q. B. D. 615. Probably also on the last. Leask v. Scott, 2 Q. B. D. 376; Lee V. Kimball, 45 Me. 172. Benjamin, Sales, 4th Am. ed., § 866. On the second point, however, the court seems to be wrong. The bill of lading must be delivered by the vendee to the sub-vendee to defeat the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, unless there comes in an element of estoppel not shown in this case. Ex parte Golding, 13 Ch. D. 628; Kemp v. Falk, 7 App. Cas. 573; Benjamin, Sales, § 862 (c), (d), 865 (a). Suretyship — Disaffirmance by Minor — Surety's Liability. — The de- fendant was surety on a note, which was given by a minor in payment of certain prop- erty. Upon attaining his majority, the minor disaffirmed the contract and returned the property. Held, that defendant is not liable on the note. Keokuk Co. State Bank v. Hall, 76 N. W. Rep. 832 (Iowa). The decision is rested upon the authority of Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82. The court, in departing from the recognized principle that the surety of an infant is bound, although the principal disaffirms his contract, is influenced by the apparent injustice of allowing the creditor to retain his property and at the same time recover the purchase price from the surety. But this difficulty can be avoided without denying the applica- tion of the general rule. A surety, upon discharging the obligation, is subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the principal, and, accordingly, the defendant in the present case would, upon payment of the note, acquire all of the creditor's rights to the property. By proceeding upon this theory, any loss due to a depreciation of the prop-