Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/556

536 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. of the Constitution are that a person "charged in any State with crime, "shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled be dehvered up," &c. The true construction of this provision is felicitously put in the opinion of Judge Andrews in People ex rel. Lawrence v. Brady : ^ — " The word crime in the clause of the Constitution which has been quoted, embraces every act forbidden and made punishable by the laws of a State, and the right of a State to demand the surrender of fugitives from justice extends to all cases of the violation of its criminal law. Com. of Kentucky z/. Denison, 24 How. (U. S.) 104. Felonies and mis- demeanor offences by statute and at common law are alike within the Constitutional provision; and the obligation to surrender the fugitive foe an act which is made criminal by the law of the demanding State, but which is not criminal in the State upon which the demand is made, is the same as if the alleged act was a crime by the law of both. " Another interpretation of the constitutional power of a demand- ing State has materially confirmed the efficacy of interstate ren- dition as a remedy. Up to the year 1893 a spirited judicial controversy existed on the question whether a fugitive surren- dered for a certain offence could be tried in the demanding State for a different offence. The courts of different States were arrayed in favor of and against such right. The mooted point was finally authoritatively settled by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lascelles v. Georgia.^ It was held that a fugitive from justice, who has been surrendered by one State to another State upon requisition charging him with the commission of a specific crime, has, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, no immunity or exemption from indict- ment and trial in the State to which he is returned for any other or different offence from that designated in the requisition, without first having an opportunity to return to the State from which he was extradited. The decision of the Supreme Court was unani- mous, and unquestionably it embodied the sound view. The argu- ment against the right to try for a different offence was founded upon a supposed analogy between international extradition and interstate rendition. The court by justice Jackson, remarked : "To apply the rule of international or foreign extradition, as an- nounced in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, to interstate ren- dition, involves the confusion of two essentially different things, which I S6N.Y. 182. ai48U. S. 537.