Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/587

RECENT CASES. 567 quasi-contractual. That the question of consideration is open in the principal case is no answer to this suggestion, for in an action on the contract recovery should be the contract price irrespective of the amount of consideration given. Hence it seems that no action on the note should be allowed against the infant maker. Wtiliamson v. IVatts, I Camp. 552; Fenton v. White, 4 N. J. Law, in ; Ayers v. Burns, 87 Ind. 245. Constitutional Law — Foreign Criminals — Habeas Corpus. — A sheriff, acting under the authority of the state of Idaho, v;as conducting a criminal, there con- victed, from one to another part of that state. In so doing it was necessary to pass through the state of Washington. While in the latter state the criminal applieci for his release on habeas corpus on the ground that he could not lawfully be detained there. Held, that such a discharge from the custody of the Idaho sheriff cannot be thus obtained, since to release the applicant would be violative of Const. U. S. art. 4, § i, requiring that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judi- cial proceedings of every other state." In re Maney, 55 Pac. Rep. 930 ( Wash.). There seems to be no authority on the question. It is clear that if a criminal of one state has fled into another he cannot be taken in the latter state by an officer acting under the authority of the former. Cf. Bromley v. Hutchins, 8 Vt. 193. Resort must be had to extradition proceedings by a demand on the governor of the second state. I Bishop, New Criminal Procedure, § 219. However, it is difficult to see why the rea- soning of the principal case would not extend the clause of the constitution to such a case and allow such a taking. It seems one thing to say that a judgment shall be given full faith and credit, and another to say that it shall be enforced as in the state where it was given. The former meaning extends to a prohibition to deny its bind- ing validity; for instance, that the title to certain land is in A. This is clearly within the intent of the constitution. But the latter meaning would render all the judicial process of one state as effectual in another state as in that from which it issued. The facts of the principal case bring it rather within the latter meaning. A contrary deci- sion would not have denied that the conviction was a subsisting and valid one. Cf. Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562. Contracts — Beneficiary. — The defendant entered into a contract with the husband of the plaintiff whereby the husband was to aid the defendant in overthrowing a clause of a will ; and in event of success the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $50,000. All conditions were performed but the defendant refused to jiay. Held, that the plaintiff may recover the $50,000. Buchanan v. Tilden, 52 N. E. Rep. 724 {N. Y.). See Notes. Contracts — Failure of Consideration. — A father conveyed a farm to his son in consideration of the son's promise to support him during life. The son mort- gaged the premises and refused to support the father. Held, that the father is entitled to a reconveyance free from the mortgage. Fayette v. Ferrier, 55 Pac. Rep. 629 (Wash.). See Notes. Corporations — Bankruptcy — Distribution of Assets. — In the bank- ruptcy proceedings in regard to the firm of Higginson and Dean, it was shown that the Royal Bank of Liverpool had been a creditor of the firm, but that the Bank had been since dissolved. Held, that the claims of the defunct Bank pass to the Crown as bona vacantia. Re Higginson &= Dean, 79 L. T. Rep. 673. See Notes, Corporations — Ultra Vires Contracts — Judgments. — A bill inequity was filed by a corporation and some of its stockholders to set aside a judgment by consent, obtained in an action against the corporation on an ultra vires contract. Held, that the relief prayed should be granted, although collusion on the part of the corporate officers in consenting to the judgment was not proved. Great Northwestern Central Ry. v. Charlebois, [1899] App. Cas. 114 (P. C.) ; s. c. 26 Canada Sup. Ct. Rep. 221. The effect, as res judicata, of a judgment against a corporation on an ultra vires contract is a difficult and undeveloped subject. Where the judgment is the judicial decision of an actual contest, the corporation and stockholders surely ought to be concluded thereby. Otherwise, questions of ultra vires would never be settled. Where the judgment is by consent, it may not possess the same character of finality. Indeed, it has been held that any judgment obtained by agreement of the parties, although effective as an estoppel so long as it stands, may be vacated for any cause which would vitiate the agreement by which it was obtained. Huddersfield, dfc. Co. v. Lister, [1895] 2 Ch. D. 273. If this be law, and if it be beyond the powers of a corpora- tion to consent to judgment on an ultra vires contract, the principal case would be correct. But it is surely within the legitimate scope of corporate business to determine whether any defence, including that of ultra vires, can successfully be raised in a pending action. Authority is curiously lacking on the precise point. If the entering