Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/75

NOTES. 55 necessities of the case and the impolicy of reducing any fend to a state of absolute uselessness. The English courts go little, if any, beyond this point. The law in England was settled by the case of Suffield v. Brown, 4 De G., J. & S. 185, that easements are impliedly reserved only where the property cannot be enjoyed without such reservation. The Supreme Court of Maine, where this rule has been followed, recently has had to apply it to an unusual state of facts before them in Hildreth v. Googins, 39 Atl. Rep. 550. The owner of a lot, bounded on one side by a highway and on the other by the ocean, sold that half of the estate which adjoined the highway without expressly reserving a way across it from the highway to the part he retained. No access could be had to the unsold portion except by the ocean or by crossing land of other owners. The Court said that implied reservations were not to be favored except in cases of strict necessity, that tiie ocean was a public highway, and as all communication was not shown to be cut off, the grantor must in future rely on such access as the sea afforded. This decision is within the letter of the rule. But the difficulties which a farmer would have to surmount in utilizing this road would generally prevent any but the most primitive use of the land ; and it seems that the court might well have refused to consider the sea as a way in the sense that a way is necessary to the farmer. The English doctrine strictly enforced appears often to reach harsh results ; and many American courts have recognized the need of a more flexible rule. The Supreme Court of Maryland in Burns et al. v. Gallagher et al., 62 Md. 462, laid down a test that has much to com- mend it ; namely, that the principles of implied reservation may be in- voked when the necessity is so strict that it would be unreasonable to suppose the parties intended the easement in question should not be used. This test, which would satisfactorily dispose of the case under discussion, is easy of application, fair to both parties, and well suited to the needs of this country. Citizenship of Children of Alien Parents. — The final word upon this phase of our law of citizenship seems to be said in the case of United States v. Wong Kin Ark, now in advance sheets. The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking by Mr. Justice Gray, held that one born of Chinese parents domiciled in California was a citizen, and could not be excluded from the United States, although he had twice returned to China. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan entered a vigorous dissent. The case is of first impression in the Supreme Court ; although the same opinion has been previously intimated. The decision follows a series of well-considered adjudications in the Circuit Court, where the law has long been regarded as settled by Mr. Justice Field in the case of In re Look Ting Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. 905. The dictum to the contrary of Mr. Justice Miller in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 73, must now be regarded as definitively overruled. Citizenship is a question not of international but of municipal law. The division of the law of citizenship into the Jus sanguinis and the jus soli is a deduction from the division of the jurisdiction of a State into the personal and the territorial. In the civil law, citizenship is by descent. At common law, all those born within the kingdom or legeance of the crown v/erQ held subjects ; and if the United States have a common law