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of each life tenant his share shall be divided among his heirs-at-law, and so on upon each successive death of the children of Nancy Gay. It contemplates that, at the death of Nancy Gay, each of her children is to have a separate and independent share, and it looks to separate and independent division of each share, at different dmes and to different persons. As each child dies his heirs are to take. . . . The inten- tion of the testator cannot be carried out except by regarding this pro- vision as separate and distinct devises to different classes, which take effect at different times, upon the respective deaths of the life tenants. The legal heirs of each child, upon his death, take his share of the estate, and as the devise to the heirs takes effect at the death of their ancestor who had the life estate^ it follows that in the case of all the children who were living at the death of the testator the devise over is not void for remoteness. In the case supposed of the after-born son, the devise over would he invalid, but this would not affect the distinct devises in favor of the heirs of his brothers and sisters; because the estates devised to them must vest within the period pre- scribed by law. We are compelled to the conclusion that the concession of counsel, and the decision of the court in Lovering v. Lovering, ubi supra, to the effect that the gifts over to the heirs-at-law of the children of Nancy Gay were void for remoteness, were erroneous. Catlin v. Brown, ii Hare, 372 ; Griffith v. Pownall, 13 Sim. 393; Wilkinson V. Duncan, 30 Beav. 1 1 1 ; Storrs v. Benbow, 3 De G., M. & G. 390 ; Pearks v, Moseley, 5 App. Cas. 714.

    • The result of this is that the heirs-at-law of Ann L. Gay, are entided,

under the thirteenth clause of the will, to the property in which she had a life interest."

For a full discussion of the principle involved in this case, and of the authorities pro and con, see Gray on Perpetuities, pp. 260-267. Mr. Gray was of the counsel in this case, representing the heirs of Ann L. Gay.


��[These cases are selected from the current Eng^Iish and American decisions not yet regularly reported, for the purpose of giving the latest and most progressive work of the courts. No pains are spared in selectin|ra//the cases, comparatively few in number, which disclose the general prog- ress and tendencies of the law. When such cases are particularly suggestive, comments and refer- ences are added, if practicable.]

Assumpsit — Work and Labor by Wife for Supposed Husband — Mis- take OF Fact. — A woman married a man and lived with him till his death. She afterwards learned that he had a former wife, still living, from whom he had not been divorced. Held, that she could not recover from his administrator for work and labor in keeping house for him during his life. Cooper, v. Cooper, 17 N. E. Rep. 892 (Mass.); s. c. 16 Mass. Law Rep. (No. 35) 15.

This case is probably law. Compare cases where a negro has failed to recover the value o{ services rendered on the supposition that he was a slave. Alfred v. Afarquis of Fitzyames, Esp. 3; Livingston v. Ackeston, 5 Cowen, 531; Negro Franklin v. Waters^ 8 Gill, 322. But see contra^ Negro Peter v. Steely 3 Yeates, 250; Jar rat v. Jarrat, 2 Oilman, i, semble ; Kinney v. Cook^ 3 Seammon, 232, semble.

The argument in these cases appears to be that the service is gratuitous, and that there can be, consequently, no implied obligation to pay for it. But there seems to be no sound objection to treating them as cases of mistake of fsct, where the plaintiff recovers the reasonable worth of something given or done because of a supposed legal obligation. However, it is not quite so clear that a