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possible, benefits which might have resulted to him from the whole future life of the child, modified by all the chances of failure and misfortune. Birkett ▼. Knickerbocker Ice Co,, i8 N. E. Rep. io8 (N. Y.).

The rule of damages is different in some jurisdictions. In Michigan, for ex. ample (^Cooper v. Z. S, & M. S. R'y Co., 33 N. W. Rep. 306), the rule aoove given is severely criticised, and the damages are limited to the loss of probable ser- vices during the minority of the child, minus the probable expense to the parent. "Anything further is incapable of pecuniary estimate.'* So m Texas {Brunswig V. White, 8 S. W. Rep. 85) and in Pennsylvania {^Penn. College v. AV^, 13 All. Rep. 841).

It should be noticed that the right to damages in these ca^es is statutory, and the measure is not exactly the same as in common-law actions of tort. While not mere injury to the feelings, but only pecuniary loss, actual or expectant, can be considered, still wide latitude is given under the statutes; but the New York case would seem to go too far. See Cooley on Torts, p. 270.

Negligence — Imputed — Driver and Passenger. — Plaintiff, while riding in a vehicle upon invitation of the owner, sustained an injury occasioned by a de- fect m the highway. Held, that the negligence of the driver which contributed to the injury could not be imputed to plaintiff. Nisbel v. Town of Garner, 39 N. W. Rep. 516 (Iowa).

In confirmation of this doctrine see the late English case of MiUs v. Armstrong, 57 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 65, which overrules the well-known case of Tliorogood v. Bryany 8 C. B. 115. See also note, 2 Harv, L. Rev. 140.

Negligence — Imputed — Parent and Child. — An infant five years of age is not precluded from recovering damages for an injury which might have been avoided by the exercise of due care on the part of his parents. Bisaillon v. Blood, 15 AU. Rep. 147 (N. H.).

The old doctrine imputing the negligence of a parent to the child is not fully sustained by the latest authorities. Thus it is said in Huff v. Ames, 19 N. W. Rep. 623, that <*in an action for damages by an infant . . . the negligence of the parent or guardian is not to be considered or imputed to the infant." Railway Co. V. Schuster, 6 Atl. Rep. 269 (Pa.), accord. But see Fitzgerald v. Railway Co., 13 N. W. Rep. 168 (Me.), and SlaUr v. Railway Co., 32 N. W. Rep. 264 (Iowa), in which the old rule of imputed negligence is followed.

Pledge — Subsequent Delivery of Possession. — Where the borrower of money agrees to deliver to the lender, at a future time, certain goods as security therefor, on the subsequent delivery of the goods in pursuance of the contract the same legal results follow as if the goods had been delivered when the money was lent, and the *' special property" in the goods passes at once to the lender. Although delivery of the goods is essential to the contract of pledge, that delivery need not be contemporaneous with the advance of the money. Hilton v. Tucker, 59 L. T. Rep. (N. s.) 172; s. c. 38 Alb. L. J. 333.

Telegraph Companies — Liability for Acts of Agent — Fraudulent Message. — Plaintiff, in response to a despatch which was sent over defendant's wires, and which apparently came from parties to whom he was in the habit of forwarding money, though, in fact, it was prepared and sent by the agent of de- fendant, forwarded to the supposed sender of the telegram fifteen hundred dol- lars in currency by the American Express Company. This money was inter- cepted by defendant's agent who sent the telegram, and who was abo agent of the express company. Held, that the transmission of the forged despatch was the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss^ and that the telegraph company was liable for the act of its servant. McCord v. Western Union Tel. Co.y 39 N. W. Rep. 315 (Minn.).

This seems to be a strange application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. The telegraph agent, in preparing and sending the false despatch, certainly did not act in the capacity of agent, but wholly on his own account.

Vendor's Lien — Assignment of Note as Collateral. — The personal lien existing in favor of the vendor of land for a note given for unpaid purchase- money is not lost by the mere assignment of the note as collateral security. Cate V. Cate, 9 S. W. Rep. 231 (Tenn.).

By the English authorities, which hold that the equity is not one personal to the vendor, the lien seems to be assignable (2 Dart's V. & P. 5th ed. 732; Dryden V. Frost, 3 Mylne & C. 670)-. The opposite view prevails generally in this country, but the above exception, which is rather apparent than real, has been made before in other States (Jones on Liens, § 1096).