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QUARANTINE LAWS, 2/5

of slavery agitation which follows, opinions were not wanting **that all those powers which relate to merely municipal regulations, or what may more properly be called internal police^ are not surren- dered by the States, or restrained [by the Constitution of the United States] ; and that consequently in relation to these the authority of a State is complete, unqualified, and exclusive." ^ The language quoted is from the opinion of the majority of the court in City of New York v. Miln,^ where it is made the ground of the decision, and considered an "impregnable position."^* In that case a law of New York was held constitutional which re- quired the masters of incoming vessels, under penalty of a fine, to report in writing to the mayor of New York the name, place of birth, and last settlement of all passengers for New York taken on board by him. Mr. Justice Story dissented, with the "entire con- currence upon the same grounds " of Chief Justice Marshall, who died after hearing the arguments, but before the final decision. The grounds of the dissenting opinion were that the power of Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce was ex- clusive, and that the States have no power to enact laws " which trench on the authority of Congress in its power to regulate com- merce." It is said also, "A State cannot make a regulation of com- merce to enforce its health laws, because it is a means withdrawn from its authority." ^ The view of Marshall and Story that the com- mercial power of Congress is a limitation upon the police power of the States is now the established doctrine. This was the express ground of decision in the leading case of Henderson v. Mayor of New York,* holding that a State cannot constitutionally impose burdens upon immigration into the United States. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, unanimously declare, " It is clear, from the nature of our complex form of government, that, whenever the statute of a State invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States, it is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall, or how closely allied to powers conceded to belong to the States." This

  • For exsunple, the opinions of Mr. Justice Grier in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 631

(1847) ; Mr. Justice McLean in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 400 (1849) ; and es- pecially City of New York v, Miln.

«xi Pet. 102, 139 (1837).

• II Pet. 156. The same idea is expressed by McLean, J., in Groves v. Slaughter^ 15 Pet. 449, 505(^^41).

  • 92U. S. 259, 272 (1875).