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bound if he had accepted the bill after it was drawn. ^ A drawer or maker would be bound in the same way and for the same reasons, but it is well to remark that a bill would seldom be drawn or a note made to a fictitious payee, except by way of accommodation.

4. A bill or note payable to an inanimate object is treated as payable to bearer, for otherwise it wouJd be void, and as the essence of the con- tract is simply to pay money, the contract will be sustained if possible.^


(ThoM CMcs are selected from the current English And American dedtions not yet regularly reportedt for the purpose of giving the latest and most progressive work of the courts. No paras are spend in seleaing ail the cases, comparatively few in number, which disclose the general progress and tendencies of the law. When such cases are particularly suggestive, comments and references are added, if practi- cable.]

Administrators — Indirect Sale by Administrator to Himself. — A, an administrator with the will annexed, was ordered by the probate court to sdl certain land at auction. At the sale, B, a banker, was purchaser for a certain sum, part of which was to be paid down in money, and the reminder in notes secured by a mort- gage. No money was actually paid down, because A trusted B to credit nim with the requisite sum on his bank account. The court then confirmed the sale, and A forthwith executed a deed to B, leaving it with counsel to be delivered on B's giving the notes and mortgage. This B did. He then conveyed the land to A upon A*8 oral agreement to discharge him from his liability as purchaser. There was nothing to show that he purchased originally because of any understanding with A. Held, that the whole transaction was void, since it came within the general proposition that a trustee cannot become a purchaser at his own sale. The case is an illustration of how far a court will go in the application of this principle. CaldwtU v. CaldwiU^ 15 N. E. Rep. 297 (Ohio).

Agency — Knowledge of Agent Imputed to Principal. — A broker em- ployed by plaintiff to reinsure a vessel, having heard that the ship was lost, notified plaintiff that insurance could only be effected at a high figure, which plaintiff declined to pay. The plaintiff then insured through other brokers. The reported loss was not communicated to him, and the policy was renewed in entire good faith. Held^ that the knowledge of the broker could not be imputed to the plaUitiff. Blackkum^ Low^ 6* Co, V. Vigors, 57 L. T. 730.

Thb case has excited wide comment. The House of Lords affirmed the original decision of Mr. Justice Day, and reversed the decision of Lords Justices Undley and Lopes in the Court of Appeal ; and, it would seem, correctly, llie Lords apparently distinguish this case from two other cases of agency : (i) captains or ship agents who have charge of the ship insured ; (a) agents through whom the insurance is effected.

    • The one class is especially employed for the purpose of communicating to [the prin-

cipal] the very facts which the law requires him to divulge to the insurer ; the other is employed, not to procure or give information concerning the ship, but to df ect an insurance." For somewhat doubtful reasons the knowledge of the first class is im- puted to the principal ; that the knowledge of the second should be imputed is clear. But, in this case, there was no legal duty resting on the broker to disclose what he knew, nor did he procure the insurance. His knowledge, therefore, is merely that of a stranger.

Attorney — Disbarment — Offering Money for Testimony. — Respond- ent, an attornev, believing a certain paper to be a forgery, employed an expert to examine it The expert expressed his doubt as to the forgery; but the respondent, supposing that the expert believed it to be a forgery and.oiUy expressed his doubt to extort money for his testimony, offered him a large, sum ot money to testify that it was a forgery. Held, no sufficient ground for debarment ; ** such conduct may be

1 LotuUn ^ S.W, Bank v. Wentwprtk, k Ex. D. q6.

  • Mechanic^ Batik v. StrcUUn ti al,, 3 Keyes, 36$ ; Ames* Cases od Bills aad Notes, vol. 1, p. 574.