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76 HARVARD LAW REVIEW have no significance as to the real legality of said contract, for the plain- tiff may have been the only consumer of this class of service, or likely to require it, and, irrespective of that, the publishing and filing of a low contract rate as a class rate does not prevent it being unlawful if it results in actual discrimination against other classes of consumers, as the court found it did here. The most important feature of the case from the view-point of our problem is that in a suit in equity by the consumer for specific per- formance of the contract, and for an injunction restraining the defend- ant from cutting oflf its service in violation thereof, the court dismissed the bill and sustained the legal right and power of the utility company to take the initiative in increasing its rates and discontinuing service under the old contract without going to the Public Service Commission for leave to do so. This case represents what may be termed the first of two general views in upholding the legal right of the public utility company, subse- quent to the passing of a public service law cheating a commission em- powered to regulate rates, to increase on its own initiative its rates for service above the maximum fixed by contract made with a private con- sumer prior to said act, and admittedly valid when made.^ The second view is presented in several recent cases which have held lie Utility Rates," page 34. Paper read at Third Annual Convention of the New Jersey Utilities Association, Atlantic City, N. J., October, 1917. ' Onondaga Golf & Country Club v. Syracuse & S. R. Co.; Denver & South Platte Ry. Co. V. City of Englewood, Colo., 161 Pac. 151, P. U. R. 1916 E, 134 (1916); Mullen & Co. V. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. (Colorado PubUc Utilities Commission), P. U. R. 1916 E, 128; Minneapwjlis, St. Paul & S. S. Ry. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co., 159 Wis. 130, 150 N. W. 411 (1914); Wolverton v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 58 Colo. 58, 142 Pac. 165 (1914); Alpena Electric Light Co. v. Kline, 180 Mich. 279, 146 N. W. 652 (1914); State v. Martsm, 82 Neb. 225, 117 N. W. 719 (1908). It has been held in New Jersey that the Public Utihties Act permits the utility to file a new schedule of rates without first obtaining permission of the Board. Re Public Service Electric Co. (New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners), P. U. R. 1918 E, 898 (1918). And in New York a very recent case holds the Public Service Commissions Law (CoNSOL. Laws, c. 48) places no restriction on the righti of gas companies to increase rates and make the increase effective prior to the time when the Public Service Com- mission shall determine whether the proposed increase is just and reasonable. Pub. Service Commission, Second District, v. Iroquois Natural Gas Co., 171 N. Y. Supp. 379 (1918). Under the Illinois Public Utilities Act the same decision has been reached, but re- stricted to the original schedules of rates only. State Public Utilities Commission V. Chicago & West Towns Ry. Co., 275 111. 555, 1 14 N. E. 325 (1916). Cases to the same effect imder the Interstate Commerce Act, as to contracts made before the act and valid when made: Southern Wire Co. v. St. Louis Bridge & Tunnel Co., 38 Mo. App. 191 (1889); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1911); Dorr v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 78 W. Va. 150, 88 S. E. 666 (1916); Carter Planing Mill Co. v. New Orleans R. Co., 112 Miss. 148, 72 So. 884 (1916). In the following cases the customers of the utility companies were subjected to penalties for accepting service at rates fixed by contract made subsequent to the pas- sage of the Interstate Commerce Act, and valid when made, but rendered invalid under the act by the public utilities raising the rates for like service to others in the manner provided by law: New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361 (1906); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56 (1908).