Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/468

432 HARVARD LAW REVIEW Harv. L. Rev. 728. A cestui que trust, however, often has no right to the possession of the res; and moreover the purpose of a trust is to relieve the beneficiary of all duties. The principal case properly protects the cestui in his reUance upon the trustee. Carriers — Rates — Recovery of by Carrier. — In 1907 the legis- lature prescribed maximum rates for the carriage of coal. The carriers re- fused to comply with the act, and the state brought an action to enjoin its continued violation. An injunction was issued and afl5rmed without preju- dice by the United States Supreme Court in March, 1910. After a period of experhnentation the carrier reopened the case, and the injunction was dissolved by the United States Supreme Court in June, 19 15. The carrier now seeks to recover from the shipper the difference between the statutory rate and an alleged reasonable rate for shipments made between the dates of the first and second decree of the United States Supreme Court. Held, that carrier could not recover. Minneapolis, St. P. &°. S. S. M. Ry. Co v Washburn L. C. Co., 168 N. W. 684 (N. D.). For a discussion of the principles involved see Notes, page 428. Conflict of Laws — Jurisdiction for Divorce — Domicile in Ex- traterritorial Community. — The husband's domicile of origin was Eng- land, but since marriage the spouses had resided in the British Protecto- rate of Egypt with intent to make it their permanent home. On the wife's petition for divorce in England, held that the husband had acquired a domi- cile of choice in Egypt, and that the EngUsh court had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding. Casdagli v. Casdagli, 146 L. T. J. 3 (1918). During the rule of the East India Company in India, the English courts held that a person of British nationaUty in the service of the company could acquire an Anglo-Indian domicile. Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229, note; Forbes I v. Forbes, 23 L. J. (Ch.) N. S. 724; Hepburn v. Skerving, 9 W. R. 764. The doc- trine was extended to cases of persons who went to India not in the service of the company but on private business of their own. Attorney General v. Fitzgerald, 25 L. J. (Ch.) N. S. 743; Allardice v. Onslow, 7,7, L. J. (Ch.) N. S. 434. But the cases of Anglo-Indian domicile were later held to be anoma- lous. See Jopp V. Wood, 34 L. J. (Ch.) N. S. 212, 219; Ex parte Cunningham, 13 Q. B. D. 418, 425; Dicey, Domicil, 140, 141, 337. Accordingly, vmtil the decision in the principal case, the English doctrine has been that a British citizen could not acqmre a domicile in a foreign country which granted ex- traterritorial privileges. In re Tootal's Trusts, 23 Ch. D. 532; Abd-ul-Messih V. Farra, 13 A. C. 431. Cf. The Derfflinger, i B. & C. P. C. 386; The Lut- zow, I B. & C. P. C. 528. In breaking away from this doctrine, the court in the principal case is to be commended. Given an abandonment of the domicile of origin, the selection of a new place of residence, and the animus manendi, it would seem immaterial that the conamunity in question does not possess the sovereign territorial power. In re Allen's Will, U. S. Court FOR China, Shanghai Term, 1907, Pamphlet; Mather v. Cunningham, 105 Me. 326, 74 Atl. 809. See Piggott, Ex-Territoriality, 1907 ed., 224-26; Jacobs, Domicil, § 361. Accordingly, in the principal case, the husband acquired an Egyptian domicile and became subject to that part of the Egyp- tian law which under the Protectorate was applicable to British subjects. See Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown, 185-86; West- lake, Private International Law, 5 ed., 345-46; Huberich, Domicile OF Privileged Foreigners, 24 L. Quart. Rev. 448. Since the husband had lost his English domicile, the English court had no jurisdiction to grant the wife's petition for divorce. Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, 1895 A. C. 517; Bater v. Bater, [1906] P. 209. See 26 Harv. L. Rev. 447.