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NOTES 559 had no actual existence, and was engaged in an activity properly exer- cised by no ofl&cer of the United States. The analogy between this case and the case concerning bills of lading is close. Congress doubtless has power to appoint officers to carry out the functions of government. Similarly it has power to regulate inter- state commerce. It is not expressly given power to punish persons who are neither officers of the United States nor attempt to exercise the powers of real officers, any more than it is expressly given power to punish persons who simiilate the methods of interstate commerce with- out actually engaging in such commerce. But because the respect and authority of its officers cannot be maintained without punishing those who simulate them, a statute was upheld which authorized the prosecu- tion of one fraudulently assuming to be such an officer, whether the office or the powers he purported to have were or could be held by any one. By a parity of reasoning, one who interferes with the legitimate transaction of interstate commerce by simulated documents may be punished in order that the legitimate instrumentalities of commerce may not fall into disrepute and fail to achieve their proper effect. The inference justified by these decisions is borne out by the general attitude of the Supreme Court towards the question of interstate commerce. "'Commerce among the several states' is a practical con- ception";^ and the Supreme Court has indicated abundantly its deter- mination to prevent anything and everything which practically impedes and interferes with interstate commerce. It has refused to permit in- terference with the physical operation of the ordinary channels of in- terstate commerce. A state was not allowed to stop the operation of telegraph lines by injunction for failure to pay taxes.'^ Nor was a state court allowed to order the removal of a railroad bridge which formed part of a direct channel of interstate commerce.^ "The freedom from interference on the part of the States is not con- fined to a simple prohibition of laws impairing it, but extends to inter- ference by any ultimate organ." ^ "The state can do nothing which will directly burden or impede the interstate traffic of the company, or impair the usefulness of its facilities for such traffic." ^" Nor are indi- viduals allowed any greater freedom than the agencies of the state in interrupting interstate commerce.^^ In In re Debs,^^ the United States, finding that the interstate trans- portation of persons and property, as well as the carriage of the mails, was forcibly obstructed, and that a combination and conspiracy ex- isted to subject the control of such transportation to the will of the • Reanich v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512 (1906). ^ Western Union v. Attorney-General, 125 U. S. 530 (1888). See Williams v, Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 415 (1912). 8 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 233 U. S. 75 (1914). ' Ibid., 78. i» Ibid., 79. " Houston & Texas Railway v. United States, 34 U. S. 342 (1914) . In the course of its opinion the court said, page 351," Congress is empowered to regulate, that is, to provide the law for the government of interstate commerce; to enact ' all appropriate legislation ' for its 'protection and advancement' (The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564); to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its safety' (Coimty of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 651); 'to foster, protect, control and restrain' (Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. i)." "^ 158 U. S. 564 (1895).