Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/777

BOOK REVIEWS 741 "Seventh principle: All members of the League of Nations agree once for all to submit all judicial disputes to International Courts which are to be set up, and to abide by their judgments. They likewise agree to submit, previous to resorting to arms, all non-judicial disputes to International Coimcils of Conciliation which are to be set up. And they all agree to unite their economic, military and naval forces against any one or more States which resort to arms without submitting their disputes to International Courts of Justice or Inter- national Councils of ConciUation" (p. 39). In modeling the League, upon the past Hague Conferences, Professor [Oppen- heim would seem to forget the dissatisfaction which the last Hague Conference produced in the minds of many, and the feeling that world affairs of really great moment could not there reach a settlement. "The rights of individual dele- gates to take up the time of the Conference," said the ranking British delegate in his ofl&cial report upon the Conference to the British Foreign Secretary, " the rights of the majority over a minority in the absence of unanimity, the power of a chairman to confine the discussion within due limits, — these and many other questions demand solution before another meeting of the Conference can prove satisfactory." (See Brit. Pari. Accounts and Papers, 1908, vol. cxxiv [Cd. 3857], p. 20.) In Professor Oppenheim's plan there is no suggestion for avoiding the stumbling block of the equality of v6tes, which has wrecked so many international schemes; if to each of the great world Powers is given a vote no greater than that accorded to the smallest principality, it is difficult to be- lieve that the five great world-controlling nations would be willing to intrust large or vital powers to a League so constituted. The only suggestion for over- coming the Unanimity Requirement, which proved such a check upon effective action of large concern at the Second Hague Conference, is the proposal that a minority shall not be able to prevent the discussion and voting upon new legis- lation, though the minority can in no way be bound by legislation so voted upon. If the new League is to be a really effective force in the world, it would seem imperative that some kind of Executive Organ or Council be created to decide _ quickly and authoritatively in each case whether common action either of a military or economic nature is to be initiated, what kind of action is to be taken, and when and how it is to be brought into play. Yet Professor Oppenheim would have no executive at aU, other than a "Permanent Council," endowed apparently with only ministerial power, much resembling the powerless Per- manent Bureaus of the various Public Unions. Similarly Professor Oppen- heim would have no international military or naval forces, and no international legislation binding upon any unwilling state. As he himself points out (p. 41), he would have no international legislation in the strict sense of the word, but only a codification of law among such states as might find it to their advantage to agree upon a common codification. In his third lecture Professor Oppenheim deals with the administration of Justice and Mediation within the League of Nations. The main feature of Professor Oppenheim's plan is the institution of an International Court of Appeal to correct errors in law of the international courts of first instance. One cannot help wondering why an Appeal Court is necessary when one thinks of the additional expense and complication of legal machinery thereby in- volved, to say nothing of the cost in time which may be so vital a matter in the settlement of international disputes. Professor Oppenheim's only reason appears to be that "just as Municipal Courts of Justice, so International Courts of Justice are not infallible. If the States are to be compelled to have their judicial disputes settled by International Administration of Justice there must be a possibility of bringing an appeal from lower International Courts to a Higher Court" (p. 63). Why an appeal court would be more likely to be in- fallible than the same judges sitting as a court of first instance. Professor Oppen-