THE CHILD LABOR LAW CASE 59 The same argument was made and rejected in the Anti-Trust cases. The necessary effect of the Anti-Trust Act is to interfere with production in a state. Its design was to break up monopolies, but the actual prohibition of trust-made goods was not held in- valid because it has had that necessary effect in states. If imfair competition through transportation in interstate commerce of child-made products cannot be touched by Congress simply be- cause of the effect on local policy, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton Act must be invahd for the same reason. The neces- sary effect of the Commodities Clause was to nullify the policy which the State of Pennsylvania had followed for generations with reference to combination between coal-producing and coal- carrying companies. This was expressly decided to be no ground for invalidity.^ Indeed, it has been settled that so far as direct regulation of intrastate rates — as purely a state matter as can be conceived — is necessary in order to effectively carry out the congressional policy with reference to interstate rates, local rates established by state laws may be set aside.^ As to foreign commerce, the same objection, repeatedly raised, has suffered the same fate. In Weber v. Freed'^^ it was urged against the validity of a prohibition of the importation of prize- fight films that the act had the necessary effect and was designed to accomplish a poHce result within the exclusive cognizance of the states. The contention was held to be frivolous. It was so held with reference to opium in Brolan v. United States,'^ with reference to sponges in The Abby Dodge, ^"^ to tea, in Buttfield v. Stranahan}^ So far as matters entirely within the control of the states are concerned, and so far as the necessary effect of the ex- ertion of Congressional power upon such control is concerned, each of these cases is indistinguishable from the Dagenhart Case. If the necessary and designed effect upon state manufacture is the test, every protective tariff measure and the early embargo acts have surely been invalid.
- ^ United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (1909); United States v.
Del., Lack. & West. R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 516 (1915).
- Shreveport Case, Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342
(1914); Adams Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617 (1917). ^ 239 U. S. 325 (1915). « 236 U. S. 216, 217 (1915)-
- 223 U. S. 166, 176 (1912). ** 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
