Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/946

9IO HARVARD LAW REVIEW The tax appears to have been one of the so-called faculty taxes, rather than an income tax. The plaintiff's ofl&ce was assessed at $500, and the assessments on it for three years had amounted al- together to $10.75. The tax could hardly be called discriminatory, for it reached not only all professions, trades and occupations, but all idle bachelors over the age of twenty-one. The absence of dis- crimination was called to the attention of the court by counsel for the county, but was not referred to in the opinion. The decision proceeded on the broad ground that the salaries of all officers of the United States are exempt from taxation by the states. It was assumed without analysis that state taxation on federal salaries, whether discriminatory or not, would affect the compensation which the federal government would have to pay its officials. While the opinion as a whole is based on political rather than on economic considerations, Mr. Justice Wayne introduces the latter when he says : "Is the officer, as such, less a means to carry into effect these great objects than the vessel which he commands, the instruments which are used to navigate her, or than the guns put on board to enforce obedience to the law? These inanimate objects, it is admitted, cannot be taxed by a state, because they are means. Is not the officer more so, who gives use and efficacy to the whole? Is not compensation the means by which his services are procured and retained? It is true it becomes his when he has earned it. If it can be taxed by a state as compensation, will not Congress have to graduate its amount, with reference to its reduction by the tax? Could Congress use an uncontrolled discretion in fixing the amount of compensation, as it would do without the inter- ference of such a tax? The execution of a national power by way of compensation to officers, can in no way be subordinate to the action of the state legislatures upon the same subject. It would destroy also all uniformity of compensation for the same service, as the taxes by the states would be different. To allow such a right of taxation to be in the states, would also in effect be to give the states a revenue out of the revenue of the United States, to which they are not constitutionally entitled, either directly or indirectly, neither by their own action, nor by that of Congress." ^^ Later on the learned justice treats a tax on the salary as equivalent to a prohibition of the receipt of the salary and therefore in direct 23 16 Pet. (U. S.) 448.