Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/206

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190 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, V. Hatcher, 44 Ga. 638 ; but see Doe d. Roberts v. Roberts^ 2 B. & Aid. 367, contra. The result is extremely unsatisfactory, for it leaves the plaintiff the legal owner of the land, and if he can in any way get in possession he can keep it. It was held in Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wend. 24, and Dyer v. Horner^ 22 Pick. 253, where a note was given in payment for a fraudulent transfer of property and the consideration had failed, that the note could not be enforced. The ground of decision in both cases is that when it appears by the evidence of either party that the transaction was fraudu- lent, the court will leave the parties just as it found them. But the rule works much more satisfactorily in the note cases, for in them the whole affair is settled and not left in the air. The rule adopted in other jurisdictions is that no one shall be allowed to set up his own fraud to maintain a claim or a defence, and accordingly it was held in Brookover v. Hurst, I Met. (Ky.) 665, and Bonesteel v. Sullivan, 104 Pa. St. 9, that a mortgage note given in fraud of creditors would be enforced. See also Philpotts v. Philpotts, 10 C. B. 85. It is evident that the application of this rule would have led to a much better result in the principal case. Real Property — Transfer of Mortgaged Land. — The defendant, by a deed conveying land to him, became bound to the grantor to pay the two mortgages on it. He failed to pay the first note, so the mortgage was foreclosed, and the claim satisfied out of the land. Held, that the grantor could recover the amount of the debt secured by the second mortgage immediately. By his contract the defendant was bound not only to relieve the grantor from personal liability, but to discharge the lien of the mort- gage ; and by his failure so to do the grantor was left without any security for the second mortgage. Field, Devens, and W. Allen, JJ., dissent. Rice v. Sattders, 24 N. E. Rep. 1079 (Mass.). Sales — Conditional Delivery. — Goods were sold for cash on delivery, and payment was made by check. Held, that the vendor could retake the goods from an innocent sub-vendee on the dishonor of the check, since the payment and delivery were conditional, and the vendor was not " equitably estopped." Nat. Bank of Com- merce V. C. B. cr- N. R. R. Co., 46 N. W. Rep. 342 (Minn.). The court does not define " equitable estoppel," but it would seem that the decision is in direct conflict with the N. Y. doctrine as expressed by Comer v. Conyngham, jy N. Y. 391. A concise statement of the authorities upon this point will be found in Benj. on Sales, 4th Am. ed. § 320, n. See also 15 Am. L. R. 381. Sales — Factor's Act — Document of Title. — Held, that a receipt for whiskey stored in a bonded warehouse of the United States is not a document of title within the meaning of the Factors' Act of Kentucky, which provides that " any custom-house permit, warehouse receipt, etc., shall be deemed a document of title." The act cannot be understood to refer to bonded warehouses, as they are subject only to the regulation of Congress, and in the charge of officers of the United States. George v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 41 Fed. Rep. 257. Statute of Frauds — Parol — Partition. — A parol partition of lands, made definite by marking a line on the ground, followed by occupancy in pursuance thereof, is sufficient to rest title. McKnight v. Bell, 19 Atl. Rep. 1036 (Pa.). This case settles the Pennsylvania law in accordance with a much earlier decision (i Bin. 216), and finally disperses the doubt occasioned by the case of Gratz v. Gratz, 4 Rawle, 411. The weight of authority is against this view. Trade-mark — Injunction. — An agent of the defendant, when asked by com- plainant's agent for a cake of " Sapolio," publicly delivered, without exjjlanation, a scouring or sand soap known and stamped as " Pride of the Kitchen," of a different size and shape from "Sapolio," and contained in a wrapper of entirely different appearance. Held, that this was, in effect, an assertion that the cake delivered was " Sapolio," and an infringement of a trade-mark, the right of property in which belonged solely to the complainant. " It is the object of the law relating to trade-marks to pre- vent one man from unfairly stealing away another's business and good-will." See 32 Fed. Rep. 97, opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley. In such a case equity will issue an in- junction to prevent the fraudulent use of the trade-mark of another. Enoch Morgan's Sons Company v. Wendover et al., U. S. Cir. Court, District of New Jersey. Trade-marks — " Union " Labels. — A label adopted by a Cigar-Makers* Union, to be pasted on boxes containing cigars made by its members, is not a