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2o6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. If we are correct in this conclusion, the existing law affords a principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds. For the protection afforded is not confined by the authorities to those cases where any particular medium or form of expression has been adopted, nor to products of the intellect. The same protection is afforded to emotions and sensations expressed in a musical composition or other work of art as to a literary composition ; and words spoken, a pantomime acted, a sonata performed, is no less entitled to protection than if each had been reduced to writing. The cir- cumstance that a thought or emotion has been recorded in a permanent form renders its identification easier, and hence may be important from the point of view of evidence, but it has no significance as a matter of substantive right. If, then, the deci- sions indicate a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations, these should receive the same protection, whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression. It may be urged that a distinction should be taken between the judges who have used it, when they have applied it to cases of unpublished manuscripts. They obviously intended to use it in no other sense, than in contradistinction to the mere interests of feeling, and to describe a substantial right of legal interest." Curtis on Copyright, pp. 93, 94. The resemblance of the right to prevent publication of an unpublished manuscript to the well-recognized rights of personal immunity is found in the treatment of it in connection with the rights of creditors. The right to prevent such publication and the right of action for its infringement, like the cause of action for an assault, battery, defa- mation, or malicious prosecution, are i.ot assets available to creditors. "There is no law which can compel an author to publish. No one can determine this essential matter of publication but the author. His manuscripts, however valuable, cannot, without his consent, be seized by his creditors as property." McLean, J., in Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5 McLean, 32, y] (1849). It has also been held that even where the sender's rights are not asserted, the re- ceiver of a letter has not such property in it as passes to his executor or admin strator as a salable asset. Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 198 (1861). " The very meaning of the word * property ' in its legal sense is * that which is pecu- liar or proper to any person ; that which belongs exclusively to one.' The first mean- ing of the word from which it is derived —^ /ri?/ri«j — is ' one's own.'" Drone on Copyright, p. 6. It is clear that a thing must be capable of identification in order to be the subject of exclusive ownership. But when its identity can be determined so that individual owner ship may be asserted, it matters not whether it be corporeal or incorporeal.